Harmonies of Political Economy: Translated from the Third French Edition, with a Notice of the Life and Writings of the AuthorBastiat, Frédéric
Philosophy
Harmonies of Political Economy: Translated from the Third French Edition, with a Notice of the Life and Writings of the Author
Bastiat, Frédéric
Economics
Here you have value discovered and defined. Here you have it in
its rigorous economic exactitude, excepting the touching trait
relative to friendship, which carries us into another sphere, that
of sympathy. We may conceive two unfortunates rendering each other
reciprocal ‹service›, without inquiring too curiously ‹which of the
two discharged the most useful employment›. The exceptional situation
imagined by the fabulist explains sufficiently that the principle
of sympathy, acting with great force, comes to absorb, so to speak,
the minute appreciation of the services exchanged—an appreciation,
however, which is indispensable in order to disengage completely
the idea of Value. That idea would be complete if all men, or the
majority of them, were struck with paralysis or blindness; for the
inexorable law of supply and demand would then predominate, and,
causing the permanent sacrifice accepted by him who fulfils the more
useful employment to disappear, would restore the transaction to the
domain of justice.
We are all blind or impotent in some respects, and we soon come to
understand that, by assisting each other, ‹the burden of misfortune
is lightened›. Hence «Exchange». We labour in order to feed, clothe,
shelter, enlighten, cure, defend, instruct one another. Hence
reciprocal «Services». We compare, we discuss, we ‹estimate› or
‹appreciate› these services. Hence «Value».
A multitude of circumstances may augment the relative importance of a
Service. We find it greater or less, according as it is more or less
useful to us—according as a greater or less number of [p136] people
are disposed to render it to us—according as it exacts from them more
or less labour, trouble, skill, time, previous study,—and according
as it saves more or less of these to ourselves. Value depends not
only on these circumstances, but on the judgment we form of them; for
it may happen, and it happens frequently, that we esteem a service
very highly because we judge it very useful, while in reality it is
hurtful. This is the reason why vanity, ignorance, error, exert a
certain influence on the essentially elastic and flexible relation
which we denominate ‹value›; and we may affirm that the appreciation
of services tends to approximate more to absolute truth and justice
in proportion as men become more enlightened, more moral, and more
refined.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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