Wealth, taking the word in its general acceptation, results from the combination of two agencies—the action of nature, and the action of man. The first is ‹gratuitous› and ‹common› by the destination of Providence, and never loses that character. The second alone is ‹provided with value›, and, consequently, ‹appropriated›. But with the development of intelligence, and the progress of civilisation, the one takes a greater and greater part, the other a less and less part, in the realization of each given utility; whence it follows that the domain of the Gratuitous and the Common is continually expanding among men relatively to the domain of Value and Property; a consoling and suggestive view of the subject, entirely hidden from the eye of science, so long as we continue to attribute Value to the co-operation of nature. [p156] Men of all religions thank God for His benefits. The father of a family blesses the bread which he breaks and distributes to his children—a touching custom, that reason would not justify were the liberality of Providence other than gratuitous. ‹Durableness›, ‹conservability›—that pretended ‹sine quâ non› of Value, is connected with the subject which I have just been discussing. It is necessary to the very existence of value, as Adam Smith thinks, that it should be fixed and realized in something which can be exchanged, accumulated, preserved, consequently in something ‹material›. “There is one sort of labour which adds[32] to the value of the subject upon which it is bestowed. There is another which has no such effect.” “The labour of the manufacturer,” he adds, “fixes and realizes itself in some particular subject or vendible commodity, ‹which lasts for some time at least› after the labour is past. The labour of the menial servant, on the contrary” (to which the author assimilates in this respect that of soldiers, magistrates, musicians, professors, etc.), “does not fix or realize itself in any particular subject or vendible commodity. His services perish in the very instant of their performance, and leave no trace of ‹value› behind them.” Here we find ‹Value› connected rather with the modifications of matter than with the satisfactions of men—a profound error; for the sole good to be obtained from the modification of material things is the attainment of that satisfaction which is the design, the end, the ‹consommation›[33] of every Effort. If, then, we realize that satisfaction by a direct and immediate effort, the result is the same; and if that effort can be made the subject of transactions, exchanges, ‹estimation›, it includes the principle of ‹Value›.