There are then, strictly speaking, two flaws in Adam Smith’s definition. The first is, that it does not take exchange into account, without which value can be neither produced nor conceived. The second is, that it makes use of too restricted a term—‹labour›; unless we give to that term an unusual extension, and include in it the ideas not only of intensity and duration, but of skill, sagacity, and even of good or bad fortune. The word ‹service›, which I substitute in my definition, removes these defects. It implies, necessarily, the idea of transmission, for no service can be rendered which is not received; and it implies [p159] also the idea of Effort, without taking for granted that the value is proportionate. It is in this, above all, that the definition of the English Economists is vicious. To say that Value resides in Labour induces us to suppose that Value and Labour are proportional, and serve as reciprocal measures of each other. This is contrary to fact, and a definition which is contrary to fact must be defective. It often happens that an exertion, considered insignificant in itself, passes with the world as of enormous ‹value›. (Take, for example, the diamond, the performance of the prima donna, a dash of a banker’s pen, a fortunate privateering adventure, a touch of Raphael’s pencil, a bull of plenary indulgence, the easy duty of an English queen, etc.) It still more frequently happens that laborious and overwhelming labour tends to what is absolutely ‹valueless›; and if it be so, how can we establish co-relation and proportion between ‹Value› and ‹Labour›? My definition removes the difficulty. It is clear that in certain circumstances one can render a great service at the expense of a very small exertion, and that in others, after great exertion, we render no service at all. And this is another reason why, in this respect, it is correct to say that the Value is in the Service rendered, rather than in the Labour bestowed, seeing that it bears proportion to the one and not to the other.