At night I experience the same want. There exists one thing capable of satisfying it very imperfectly, a wax candle. My judgment pronounces in favour of the utility, but far inferior utility, of that thing—and it ‹has value›. Why? Because the man who has taken the trouble to make the candle will not give it to me except upon condition of my rendering him an equivalent service. What we have, then, to compare and to judge of, in order to determine Value, is not the ‹relative utility› of things, but the relation of two services. On these terms, I do not reject Storch’s definition. Permit me to recapitulate a little, in order to show clearly that my definition contains all that is true in the definitions of my predecessors, and eliminates everything in them which is erroneous either through excess or defect. The principle of Value, we have seen, resides in a human ‹service›, and results from the appreciation of two services compared. Value must have relation to Effort. ‹Service› implies a certain Effort. Value supposes a comparison of Efforts exchanged, at least exchangeable. ‹Service› implies the terms to give and to receive. [p169] Value is not, however, in fact proportional to the intensity of the Efforts. ‹Service› does not necessarily imply that proportion. A multitude of external circumstances influence value without constituting value itself. The word ‹service› takes all these circumstances in due measure into account. ‹Materiality.›—When the service consists in transferring a material thing, nothing hinders us from saying, by metonymy, that it is the thing which ‹has value›. But we must not forget that this is a figure of speech, by which we attribute to things themselves the value of the services which produced them. ‹Conservability.›—Without reference to the consideration of materiality, value endures until the satisfaction is obtained, and no longer. Whether the satisfaction follows the effort more or less nearly—whether the service is personal or real, makes no change in the nature of value. ‹Capability of Accumulation.›—In a social point of view, what is accumulated by saving is not matter, but value or services.[35] ‹Utility.›—I admit, with M. Say, that Utility is the foundation of Value, provided it is granted me that we have no concern with the utility which resides in commodities, but with the relative utility of services. ‹Labour.›—I admit, with Ricardo, that Labour is the foundation of Value, provided, first of all, the word labour is taken in the most general sense, and that you do not afterwards assert a proportionality which is contrary to fact; in other words, provided you substitute for the word ‹labour› the word ‹service›. ‹Rarity.›—I admit, with Senior, that rarity influences ‹value›. But why? Because it renders the ‹service› so much more precious.