Well, then, in place of remaining an isolated being, suppose this man to have relations with his fellow-men. They exchange; and I repeat my observation,—in proportion as they acquire skill, experience, force, and intelligence,—in proportion as nature (become more liberal or brought more into subjection) lends them more efficacious co-operation, they obtain ‹more wealth with less trouble›; they have at their disposal a greater amount of gratuitous utility; in their transactions they transfer to one another a greater sum of useful results in proportion to a given amount of labour. Where, then, is the contradiction? If, indeed, following the example of Adam Smith and his successors, you commit the error of applying the same denomination—‹value›—both to the results obtained and to the exertion made; in that case, an antinomy or contradiction will show itself. But be assured that that contradiction is not at all in the facts, but in your own erroneous explanation of those facts. M. Proudhon ought, then, to have shaped his proposition thus: [p190] It being granted that man has need of a great variety of products, that he can only obtain them by his labour, and that he has the precious gift of educating and improving himself, nothing in the world is more natural than the sustained increase of results in relation to efforts; and there is nothing at all contradictory in a given value serving as the vehicle of a greater amount of realized utility. Let me repeat, once more, that for man Utility is the fair side of the medal and Value the reverse. Utility has relation only to our Satisfactions, Value only with our Pains. Utility realizes our enjoyments, and is proportioned to them; Value attests our native weakness, springs from obstacles, and is proportioned to those Obstacles. In virtue of the law of human perfectibility, gratuitous utility tends more and more to take the place of onerous utility, expressed by the word ‹value›. Such is the phenomenon, and it presents assuredly nothing contradictory. But the question recurs—Should the word Wealth comprehend these two kinds of utility united, or only the last? If we could form, once for all, two classes of utilities, putting on the one side all those which are gratuitous, and on the other all those which are onerous, we should form, at the same time, two classes of Wealth, which we should denominate, with M. Say, ‹Natural Wealth› and ‹Social Wealth›; or else, with M. de Saint-Chamans, the ‹Wealth of Enjoyment› and the ‹Wealth of Value›; after which, as these authors propose, we should have nothing mere to do with the first of these classes.