Another observation, which we owe to J. B. Say, and which is almost self-evident, although too much neglected by many authors, is, that man ‹creates› neither the ‹materials› nor the ‹forces› of nature, if we take the word ‹create› in its exact signification. These materials, these forces, have an independent existence. Man can only combine them or displace them, for his own benefit or that [p091] of others. If for his own, ‹he renders a service to himself›,—if for the benefit of others, ‹he renders service to his fellows›, and has the right to exact an ‹equivalent› service. Whence it also follows that ‹value› is proportional to the service rendered, and not at all to the absolute ‹utility› of the thing. For this ‹utility› may be in great part the result of the ‹gratuitous› action of Nature, in which case the human service, the onerous service, the service to be remunerated, is of little value. This results from the axiom above established—namely, that ‹to bring a thing to the highest degree of utility, the action of man is inversely as the action of Nature›. This observation overturns the doctrine which places value in the ‹materiality› of things. The contrary is the truth. The materiality is a quality given by Nature, and consequently ‹gratuitous›, and devoid of ‹value›, although of incontestable utility. Human action, which can never succeed in ‹creating› matter, constitutes alone the service which man in a state of isolation renders to himself, or that men in society render to each other; and it is the free appreciation of these ‹services› which is the foundation of ‹value›. Far, then, from concluding with Adam Smith that it is impossible to conceive of value otherwise than as residing in material substance, we conclude that between Matter and Value there is no possible relation. This erroneous doctrine Smith deduced logically from his principle, that those classes alone are ‹productive› who operate on material substances. He thus prepared the way for the modern error of the ‹socialists›, who have never done representing as ‹unproductive› parasites those whom they term ‹intermediaries› between the producer and consumer—the merchant, the retail dealer, etc. Do they render services? Do they save us trouble by taking trouble for us? In that case they create ‹value›, although they do not create matter; and as no one can create matter, and we all confine our exertions to rendering reciprocal services, we pronounce with justice that all, including agriculturists and manufacturers, are ‹intermediaries› in relation one to another.