Harper's New Monthly Magazine, No. IX.—February, 1851.—Vol. II.Various
General
Harper's New Monthly Magazine, No. IX.—February, 1851.—Vol. II.
Various
American literature -- Periodicals; Civilization -- Periodicals; Culture -- Periodicals
Such were the causes, and such the reasonings, which gradually ate
deeper and deeper into their minds, rendering them at first sullen,
gloomy, and suspicious, and at last insubordinate, and openly insulting
to us.
Their leaders were the first to exhibit this state of feeling. Affecting
a haughty disdain for us, they went about with disparaging stories of
the French soldiery; and at last went even so far as to impugn their
courage!
In one of the versions of the affair of Castlebar, it was roundly
asserted, that but for the Irish threatening to fire on them, the French
would have turned and fled; while in another, the tactics of that day
were all ascribed to the military genius of Neal Kerrigan, who,
by-the-by, was never seen from early morning until late the same
afternoon, when he rode into Castlebar on a fine bay horse that belonged
to Captain Shortall of the Royal Artillery!
If the feeling between us and our allies was something less than
cordial, nothing could be more friendly than that which subsisted
between us and such of the Royalists as we came in contact with. The
officers who became our prisoners were treated with every deference and
respect. Two field-officers and a captain of carbineers dined daily with
the General, and Serazin entertained several others. We liked them
greatly; and I believe I am not flattering if I say that they were
equally satisfied with us. "Nos âmis l'ennemie," was the constant
expression used in talking of them; and every day drew closer the ties
of this comrade regard and esteem.
Such was the cordial tone of intimacy maintained between us, that I
remember well, one evening at Humbert's table, an animated discussion
being carried on between the General and an English staff-officer on the
campaign itself--the Royalist averring, that, in marching southward at
all, a gross and irreparable mistake had been made, and that if the
French had occupied Sligo, and extended their wings toward the north,
they would have secured a position of infinitely greater strength, and
also become the centre for rallying round them a population of a very
different order from the half-starved tribes of Mayo.
Humbert affected to say that the reason for his actual plan was, that
twenty thousand French were daily expected to land in Lough Swilly, and
that the western attack was merely to occupy time and attention, while
the more formidable movement went on elsewhere.
I know not if the English believed this; I rather suspect not. Certes,
they were too polite to express any semblance of distrust of what was
told them with all the air of truth.
It was amusing, too, to see the candor with which each party discussed
the other to his face; the French general criticising all the faulty
tactics and defective manoeuvres of the Royalists; while the English
never hesitated to aver, that whatever momentary success might wait upon
the French arms, they were just as certain to be obliged to capitulate
in the end.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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