In these new experiments the filled and the open spaces were compared separately with optical distances. After the finger-tip was drawn over the filled path, judgment was given on it at once by comparing it directly with an optical distance. In this way the foreshortening effect of time was excluded. In all these experiments it was seen that the filled space was judged longer when the judgment was pronounced on it at once than when an interval of time was allowed, either by drawing the finger-tip out over the open space, as in the previous experiment, or by requiring the subject to withhold his judgment until a certain signal was given. Any postponement of the judgment resulted in the disappearance of a certain amount of the illusion. The judgments that were made rapidly and without deliberation were subject to the strongest illusion. I have already spoken of the unanimous testimony which all who have made quantitative studies in the corresponding optical illusions have given in this matter of the diminution of the illusion with the lapse of time. The judgments that were made without deliberation always exhibited the strongest tendency to illusion. I have already said that the illusion for passive touch was greatest when the two spaces were presented simultaneously and adjacent. Dresslar has mentioned in his studies on the 'Psychology of Touch,' that the time factor cannot enter into an explanation of this illusion; but the experiments of which I have just spoken seem to point plainly to a very intimate relation between this illusion and the illusions in our judgments of time. We have here presented on a diminutive scale the illusions which we see in our daily experience in comparing past with present stretches of time. It is a well-known psychological experience that a filled time appears short in passing, but long in retrospect, while an empty time appears long in passing, but short in retrospect. Now this illusion of the open and filled space, for the finger-tip, is at every point similar to the illusion to which our time judgment is subject. If we pronounce judgment on a filled space or filled time while we are still actually living in it, it seems shorter than it really is, because, while we pay attention to the discrete sensations of external origin, we lose sight of the sensations of internal origin, which are the sole means whereby we measure lapse of time, and we consequently underestimate such stretches of time or space. But when the sensations from the outer world which enter into such filled spaces or times exist only in memory, the time-measuring sensations of internal origin are allowed their full effect; and such spaces and times seem much longer than when we are actually passing through them.