Now such a space theory is plainly not to be confused with the theory that makes the reversibility of the spatial series its primary property. It is evident that we can have a series of sensations which may be reversed and yet not give the notion of space. But we should always have space-perception if one half of the circular process above described comes from an outer activity, and the other half from an inner activity. This way of describing the reversibility of the spatial series makes it less possible to urge against it the objections that Stumpf[20] has formulated against Bain's genetic space-theory. Stumpf's famous criticism applies not only to Bain, but also to the other English empiricists and to Wundt. Bain says: "When with the hand we grasp something moving and move with it, we have a sensation of one unchanged contact and pressure, and the sensation is imbedded in a movement. This is one experience. When we move the hand over a fixed surface, we have with the feelings of movement a succession of feelings of touch; if the surface is a variable one, the sensations are constantly changing, so that we can be under no mistake as to our passing through a series of tactual impressions. This is another experience, and differs from the first not in the sense of power, but in the tactile accompaniment. The difference, however, is of vital importance. In the one case, we have an object moving and measuring time and continuous, in the other case we have coëxistence in space. The coëxistence is still further made apparent by our reversing the movement, and thereby meeting the tactile series in the inverse order. Moreover, the serial order is unchanged by the rapidity of our movements."[21] [20] Stumpf, K., 'Ueber d. psycholog. Ursprung d. Raumvorstellung,' Leipzig, 1873, S. 54. [21] Bain, A., 'The Senses and the Intellect,' 3d ed., New York, 1886, p. 183.