This conception of emotional states of mind as perceptions of bodily sensations would hardly have been promulgated, if the authors had tried to base it on experiments performed in the laboratory. An emotion but not the feeling-tone of a simple sensation may be mistaken for the sum of bodily sensations. It is, furthermore, remarkable that the promoters of this theory do not make a clear distinction between sensation and feeling. They introduce an emotional element by calling the perception of bodily changes a feeling of these changes. Only in this way do they succeed in building up emotional states of mind out of elements which are seemingly sensational. This does not succeed if the word feeling is replaced by the word sensation. The failure of this theory is due to two facts, first to the starting from a philosophical doctrine, and second to the lack of a precise distinction between feeling and sensation. It cannot be doubted after the above discussion how a definition of this difference may be given which holds for every empirical investigation. A sense-stimulus produces a complex of nervous and central processes. Among these is a certain group of processes which manifest themselves by changing the innervation of the heart, the blood-vessels, the lungs, and certain muscles. Another group is formed by those nervous and central processes which are more or less immediate effects of the sense-stimulation. The first group of processes is referred subjectively to an emotional state of mind, and the second to a cognitive process; the first group of processes is the physiological accompaniment of feelings, the second that of sensations. The relative independence of the first group from the second group is warranted by the fact that the same processes are observed as accompaniments of ideational processes. A strict limit between these two groups of processes can be drawn when the central processes are better known, because to the first group belong all those processes which are found to be accompaniments as well of sensational as of ideational processes. In different sensations the emotional process may be more or less marked, and in others the cognitive process may be prominent, but it seems that feelings are an invariable accompaniment of the sensation. This suggests the definition of feelings as psychic processes, the physiological accompaniment of which are central processes which depend largely on the state of the organism, and which manifest themselves by changes in the innervation of the heart, the blood-vessels, the lungs, and muscles. The impossibility of directly comparing the sensations of different subjects is recognized, and it is also impossible to compare feelings, because in either case we are dealing with psychic processes. FOOTNOTES: [Footnote 29: Comptes Rendus, vol. 50, p. 637, 1860.]