Frequently, too, the attempted introspection at this point failed to fix upon any feeling-tone at all definite. The condition was one of confusion and bewilderment. The state of mind when one cannot feel at all definitely seems to correspond closely to that state of mental confusion when thought processes are in a jumble, with no path for the moment leading anywhere. All these difficulties were overcome, partially at any rate, by continued training. It was not as if introspection revealed the fact that there was nothing to be found, and this was frequently reported by the subjects. After some time the touch character could be retained, and its peculiar value for feeling did not disappear when other things came in and contributed an affective element of their own. The old law of the opposition, or mutual exclusiveness, of feelings would thus seem to mean little more than that we, generally speaking, experience one thing at a time. Without a special analytical purpose in view, we do not find many distinct elemental feelings, as we do not, until we psychologize, find elements of cognitive character separable. It has been, and is now, commonly supposed that myriads of ideational elements, partially analyzable at any rate, go to make up what we choose to call a single perception. This experience as a whole is of some affective nature; but, as generally stated, of one unanalyzable sort always. It is true just in the same sense as in the cognitive state, perception. In the sense that every perception is unique, in this sense every affective state is likewise a unit. The evidence I submit, however, is that one may be the subject of analysis into elemental parts just as much as the other. Affection, as Titchener defines it at the beginning of his treatment of feelings, is merely a "tilt of the whole organism." If this is the ultimate statement, then there are no combinations, and no relations of feelings except that of mutual exclusion from the field of awareness. He has taken only one of the above possible attitudes toward affective states. Geiger, in his study of very complex emotions, however, has taken the other attitude, and bases his whole position upon it. This present experimental test furnishes evidence that the latter position is also a legitimate, and perhaps more desirable position, if feeling shall have scientific analytical treatment.