To my mind the most valuable thing to be gained from this division of the experiment is the suggestion that there are definite types of certainty, and that people may be classified by these. There are obviously marked individual variations as to the characteristics of this feeling. I should expect from my work this year that two pretty distinct types could be discovered. For one of these, certainty in a judgment as to an experience would rest very largely upon the vividness of an image; for the other, upon the congruence of an image with other previously accepted images, that is, the absence of conflicting images when the experience judged about is imagined part of a wide setting of past experiences. I should not expect either element of certainty to appear absolutely, without the other form. For many people one element would predominate in certain fields, as in judgments regarding sense-experiences, the other in the more logical fields. For some, again, perhaps, the two would be nearly coördinate in every experience of certainty. But for some subjects, as, I think, for subject K here, the vividness of the image would always be the determining factor, while for others, as for subject H, congruence with wider experience would be much more important. This classification of subjects according to their types of certainty might develop into a much more complicated affair. The experiments described here have gone no farther than to suggest lines along which it may perhaps run. There may be other elements equally important with these two. A set of experiments consisting of attempts to raise uncertainty to certainty would bring out the essentials of certainty from a new point of view, and would, perhaps, test this theory that individuals may be classified according to the types of their certainty, in the most satisfactory manner. II. THE EFFECT OF VOLUNTARILY ATTENDING TO CERTAIN ASPECTS OF A TOTAL EXPERIENCE UPON CERTAINTY IN THE JUDGMENTS AS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THAT TOTAL EXPERIENCE.