Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume 2 (of 3)Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich
Philosophy
Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume 2 (of 3)
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich
Philosophy -- History
Here we have concluded the first division of Greek philosophy, and
we have now to pass to the second period. The first period of Greek
philosophy extended to Aristotle, to the attainment of a scientific
form in which knowledge has reached the standing of free thought. Thus
in Plato and Aristotle the result was the Idea; yet we saw in Plato
the universal made the principle in a somewhat abstract way as the
unmoved Idea; in Aristotle, on the other hand, thought in activity
became absolutely concrete as the thought which thinks itself. The next
essential, one which now is immediately before us, must be contained in
that into which Philosophy under Plato and Aristotle had formed itself.
This necessity is none other than the fact that the universal must now
be proclaimed free for itself as the universality of the principle, so
that the particular may be recognized through this universal; or the
necessity of a systematic philosophy immediately enters in, what we
formerly called one in accordance with the unity of the Notion. We
may speak of the Platonic and Aristotelian systems, but they are not
in the form of a system; for that it is requisite that one principle
should be maintained and consistently carried through the particular.
In the perfect complex of the conception of the universe as it is
to Aristotle, where everything is in the highest form of scientific
knowledge led back to what is speculative, however empiric may be his
manner of setting to work, there certainly is one principle brought
forward, and that a speculative one, though it is not brought forward
as being one. The nature of the speculative has not been explicitly
brought to consciousness as the Notion—as containing in itself the
development of the manifold nature of the natural and spiritual
universe, consequently it is not set forth as the universal, from which
the particular was developed. Aristotle’s logic is really the opposite
of this. He in great measure passes through a series of the living
and the dead, makes them confront his objective, that is, conceiving
thought, and grasps them in his understanding; each object is on its
own account a conception which is laid open in its determinations,
and yet he also brings these reflections together, and thereby is
speculative. If even Plato on the whole proceeded in an empiric way,
taking up this and that idea, each of which is in turn examined, with
Aristotle this loose method of procedure appears still more clearly. In
the Aristotelian teaching the Idea of the self-reflecting thought is
thus grasped as the highest truth; but its realization, the knowledge
of the natural and spiritual universe, constitutes outside of that
Idea a long series of particular conceptions, which are external
to one another, and in which a unifying principle, led through the
particular, is wanting. The highest Idea with Aristotle consequently
once more stands only as a particular in its own place and without
being the principle of his whole philosophy.
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