Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume 2 (of 3)Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich
Philosophy
Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume 2 (of 3)
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich
Philosophy -- History
Thus they draw the conclusion that “the gods make known to men the
future”—a system of reasoning in which the entirely particular ends
of individuals also form the interests of the gods. To make men know
and comprehend at one time and not at another, is an inconsistency,
_i.e._ an incomprehensibility, but this very incomprehensibility, this
obscurity, is the triumph of the common way of regarding religions
affairs. Thus in the Stoics all the superstitions of Rome had their
strongest supporters; all external, teleological superstition is taken
under their protection and justified. Because the Stoics started from
the assertion that reason is God (it certainly is divine, but it
does not exhaust divinity), they immediately made a bound from this
universal to the revelation of that which operates for the sake of
individual ends. The truly rational is doubtless revealed to men as the
law of God; but the useful, what is in conformity with individual ends,
is not revealed in this truly divine revelation.
2. LOGIC.
In the second place, as to the intellectual side of the philosophy, we
must first of all. consider the principle of the Stoics in answering
the question of what the true and rational is. In regard to the source
of our knowledge of truth, or of the criterion, which in those times
used to be discussed (Vol. I. p. 474, Vol. II. p. 233), the Stoics
decided that the scientific principle is the conception that is laid
hold of (φαντασία καταληπτική), for the true as well as for the good;
for the true and good are set forth as content or as the existent.
Thus a unity of apprehending thought and Being is set forth in which
neither can exist without the other; by this is meant not sensuous
conception as such, but that which has returned into thought and become
proper to consciousness. Some of the older Stoics, amongst whom we
certainly find Zeno, called this criterion the very truth of reason
(ὀρθὸς λόγος). Ordinary conception on its own account (φαντασία) is
an impression (τύπωσις), and for it Chrysippus used the expression
alteration (ἐτεροίωσις).[133] But that the conception should be true,
it must be comprehended; it begins with feeling, whereby in fact the
type of another is brought into us; the second step is that we should
transform this into part of ourselves, and this first of all occurs
through thought.
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