Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume 3 (of 3)Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich
PhilosophyPhilosophy
Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume 3 (of 3)
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich
Philosophy -- History
b. Descartes sought something in itself certain and true, which should
neither be only true like the object of faith without knowledge, nor the
sensuous and also sceptical certainty which is without truth. The whole
of Philosophy as it had been carried on up to this time was vitiated by
the constant presupposition of something as true, and in some measure,
as in the Neo-Platonic philosophy, by not giving the form of scientific
knowledge to its matter, or by not separating its moments. But to
Descartes nothing is true which does not possess an inward evidence
in consciousness, or which reason does not recognize so clearly and
conclusively that any doubt regarding it is absolutely impossible.
“Because we thus reject or declare to be false everything regarding which
we can have any doubt at all, it is easy for us to suppose that there is
no God, no heaven, no body—but we cannot therefore say that we do not
exist, who think this. For it is contradictory to say that what thinks
does not exist. Hence the knowledge that ‘I think, therefore I am,’ is
what we arrive at first of all, and it is the most certain fact that
offers itself to everyone who follows after philosophy in an orderly
fashion. This is the best way of becoming acquainted with the nature of
spirit and its diversity from body. For if we inquire who we are who can
set forth as untrue everything which is different from ourselves, we
clearly see that no extension, figure, change of position, nor any such
thing which can be ascribed to body, constitutes our nature, but only
thought alone; which is thus known earlier and more certainly than any
corporeal thing.”[157] ‘I’ has thus significance here as thought, and
not as individuality of self-consciousness. The second proposition of
the Cartesian philosophy is hence the immediate certainty of thought.
Certainty is only knowledge as such in its pure form as self-relating,
and this is thought; thus then the unwieldy understanding makes its way
on to the necessity of thought.
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