Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume 3 (of 3)Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich
PhilosophyPhilosophy
Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume 3 (of 3)
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich
Philosophy -- History
Other propositions have been set against that of Descartes.
Gassendi,[161] for example, asks if we might not just as well say
_Ludificor, ergo sum_: I am made a fool of by my consciousness, therefore
I exist—or properly speaking, therefore I am made a fool of. Descartes
himself recognized that this objection merited consideration, but he
here repels it, inasmuch as it is the ‘I’ alone and not the other
content which has to be maintained. Being alone is identical with pure
thought, and not its content, be it what it may. Descartes further says:
“By thought I, however, understand all that takes place in us within
our consciousness, in as far as we are conscious of it; thus will,
conception, and even feeling are identical with thought. For if I say
‘I see,’ or ‘I walk out,’ and ‘therefore I am,’ and understand by this
the seeing and walking which is accomplished by the body, the conclusion
is not absolutely certain, because, as often happens in a dream, I may
imagine that I can see or walk even if I do not open my eyes nor move
from my place, and I might also possibly do so supposing I had no body.
But if I understand it of the subjective feeling or the consciousness of
seeing or walking itself, because it is then related to the mind that
alone feels or thinks that it sees or walks, this conclusion is perfectly
certain.”[162] “In a dream” is an empirical mode of reasoning, but there
is no other objection to it. In willing, seeing, hearing, &c., thought is
likewise contained, it is absurd to suppose that the soul has thinking
in one special pocket, and seeing, willing, &c., in others. But if I say
‘I see,’ ‘I walk out,’ there is present on the one hand my consciousness
‘I,’ and consequently thought, on the other hand, however, there is
present willing, seeing, hearing, walking, and thus a still further
modification of the content. Now because of this modification I cannot
say ‘I walk, and therefore I am,’ for I can undoubtedly abstract from
the modification, since it is no longer universal Thought. Thus we must
merely look at the pure consciousness contained in the concrete ‘I.’ Only
when I accentuate the fact that I am present there as thinking, is pure
Being implied, for only with the universal is Being united.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account