Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume 3 (of 3)Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich
PhilosophyPhilosophy
Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume 3 (of 3)
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich
Philosophy -- History
The first of the fundamental determinations of the Cartesian metaphysics
is from the certainty of oneself to arrive at the truth, to recognize
Being in the Notion of thought. But because in the thought “I think,”
I am an individual, thought comes before my mind as subjective;
Being is hence not demonstrated in the Notion of thought itself, for
what advance has been made is merely in the direction of separation
generally. In the second place the negative of Being likewise comes
before self-consciousness, and this negative, united with the positive
I, is so to speak implicitly united in a third, in God. God, who before
this was a non-contradictory potentiality, now takes objective form to
self-consciousness, He is all reality in so far as it is positive, _i.e._
as it is Being, unity of thought and Being, the highest perfection of
existence; it is just in the negative, in the Notion of this, in its
being an object of thought, that Being is contained. An objection to
this identity is now old—Kant urged it likewise—that from the Notion of
the most perfect existence more does not follow than that _in_ thought
existence here and now and the most perfect essence are conjoined, but
not _outside_ of thought. But the very Notion of present existence is
this negative of self-consciousness, not out of thought,—but the thought
of the ‘out of thought.’
2. Descartes accepts Being in the entirely positive sense, and has
not the conception of its being the negative of self-consciousness:
but simple Being, set forth as the negative of self-consciousness,
is extension. Descartes thus separates extension from God, remains
constant to this separation, unites the universe, matter, with God in
such a way as to make Him its creator and first cause: and he has the
true perception that conservation is a continuous creation, in so far
as creation as activity is asserted to be separated. Descartes does
not, however, trace extension in a true method back to thought; matter,
extended substances, stand over against the thinking substances which
are simple; in as far as the universe is created by God, it could not
be as perfect as its cause. As a matter of fact the effect is less
perfect than the cause, since it is that which is posited, if we are to
remain at the conception of cause pertaining to the understanding. Hence
according to Descartes extension is the less perfect. But as imperfect
the extended substances cannot exist and subsist through themselves or
their Notion; they thus require every moment the assistance of God for
their maintenance, and without this they would in a moment sink back into
nothing. Preservation is, however, unceasing reproduction.[178]
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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