Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume 3 (of 3)Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich
PhilosophyPhilosophy
Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume 3 (of 3)
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich
Philosophy -- History
As regards things, on which Descartes now directs his attention, the
other side to these eternal verities, the universal determinations
of things are substance, permanence, order, &c.[181] He then gives
definitions of these thoughts, just as Aristotle draws up a list of the
categories. But although Descartes laid it down formerly as essential
that no hypotheses must be made, yet now he takes the conceptions, and
passes on to them as something found within our consciousness. He defines
substance thus: “By substance I understand none other than a thing
(_rem_) which requires no other something for existence; and there is
only one thing, namely God, which can be regarded as such a substance
requiring no other thing.” This is what Spinoza says; we may say that it
is likewise the true definition, the unity of Notion and reality: “All
other” (things) “can only exist by means of a concurrence (_concursus_)
of God”; what we still call substance outside of God thus does not exist
for itself, does not have its existence in the Notion itself. That is
then called the system of assistance (_systema assistentiæ_) which
is, however, transcendental. God is the absolute uniter of Notion and
actuality; other things, finite things which have a limit and stand in
dependence, require something else. “Hence if we likewise call other
things substances, this expression is not applicable both to them and
to God _univoce_, as is said in the schools; that is to say no definite
significance can be given to this word which would equally apply both to
God and to the creatures.”[182]
“But I do not recognize more than two sorts of things; the one is that
of thinking things, and the other that of things which relate to what
is extended.” Thought, the Notion, the spiritual, the self-conscious,
is what is at home with itself, and its opposite is contained in what
is extended, spatial, separated, not at home with itself nor free.
This is the real distinction (_distinctio realis_) of substances: “The
one substance can be clearly and definitely comprehended without the
other. But the corporeal and the thinking and creating substance can
be comprehended under this common notion, for the reason that they
are things which require God’s support alone in order to exist.” They
are universal; other finite things require other things as conditions
essential to their existence. But extended substance, the kingdom of
nature, and spiritual substance, do not require one another.[183]
They may be called substances, because each of them constitutes an
entire range or sphere, an independent totality. But because, Spinoza
concluded, each side, the kingdom of thought as well as nature, is one
complete system within itself, they are likewise in themselves, that is
absolutely, identical as God, the absolute substance; for thinking spirit
this implicit is thus God, or their differences are ideal.
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