Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume 3 (of 3)Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich
PhilosophyPhilosophy
Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume 3 (of 3)
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich
Philosophy -- History
a. What is most important in this book is his idea of the origin of our
knowledge. He says: “The essence of the soul is in thought, just as that
of matter is in extension. All else, such as sensation, imagination and
will, are modifications of thought”. He thus begins with two sides,
between which he sets an absolute chasm, and then he follows out in
detail the Cartesian idea of the assistance of God in knowledge. His main
point is that “the soul cannot attain to its conceptions and notions
from external things.” For when I and the thing are clearly independent
of one another and have nothing in common, the two can certainly not
enter into relation with one another nor be for one another. “Bodies are
impenetrable; their images would destroy one another on the way to the
organs.” But further: “The soul cannot beget ideas from itself, nor can
they be inborn,” for as “Augustine has said, ‘Say not that ye yourselves
are your own light.’” But how then comes extension, the manifold, into
the simple, into the spirit, since it is the reverse of the simple,
namely the diverse? This question regarding the association of thought
and extension is always an important one in Philosophy. According to
Malebranche the answer is, “That we see all things in God.” God Himself
is the connection between us and them, and thus the unity between the
thing and thought. “God has in Him the ideas of all things because He has
created all; God is through His omnipresence united in the most intimate
way with spirits. God thus is the place of spirits,” the Universal
of spirit, “just as space” is the universal, “the place of bodies.
Consequently the soul knows in God what is in Him,” bodies, “inasmuch
as He sets forth” (inwardly conceives) “created existence, because all
this is spiritual, intellectual, and present to the soul.”[211] Because
things and God are intellectual and we too are intellectual, we perceive
them in God as they are, so to speak, intellectual in Him. If this be
further analyzed it in no way differs from Spinozism. Malebranche indeed
in a popular way allows soul and things to subsist as independent,
but this independence vanishes away like smoke when the principle is
firmly grasped. The catechism says: “God is omnipresent,” and if this
omnipresence be developed Spinozism is arrived at; and yet theologians
then proceed to speak against the system of identity, and cry out about
Pantheism.
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