Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume 3 (of 3)Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich
PhilosophyPhilosophy
Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume 3 (of 3)
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich
Philosophy -- History
Since now every monad, as shut up within itself, has no influence upon
the body and its movements, and yet the infinite multitude of their
atoms correspond with one another, Leibnitz places this harmony in God;
a better definition of the relation and the activity of the Monad of
monads is therefore that it is what pre-establishes harmony in the
changes of the monads.[270] God is the sufficient reason, the cause of
this correspondence; He has so arranged the multitude of atoms that the
original changes which are developed within one monad correspond with
the changes of the others. The pre-established harmony is to be thought
of somewhat in this style; when a dog gets a beating, the pain develops
itself in him, in like fashion the beating develops itself in itself, and
so does the person who administers the beating: their determinations all
correspond with one another, and that not by means of their objective
connection, since each is independent.[271] The principle of the harmony
among the monads does not consequently belong to them, but it is in God,
who for that very reason is the Monad of monads, their absolute unity.
We saw from the beginning how Leibnitz arrived at this conception. Each
monad is really possessed of the power of representation, and is as such
a representation of the universe, therefore implicitly the totality of
the whole world. But at the same time this representation is not in
consciousness; the naked monad is implicitly the universe, and difference
is the development of this totality in it.[272] What develops itself
therein is at the same time in harmony with all other developments; all
is one harmony. “In the universe all things are closely knit together,
they are in one piece, like an ocean: the slightest movement transmits
its influence far and wide all around.”[273] From a single grain of
sand, Leibnitz holds, the whole universe might be comprehended in its
entire development—if we only knew the sand grain thoroughly. There is
not really much in all this, though it sounds very fine; for the rest of
the universe is considerably more than a grain of sand, well though we
knew it, and considerably different therefrom. To say that its essence
is the universe is mere empty talk: for the fact is that the universe
as essence is not the universe. To the sand grain much must be added
which is not present; and since thought adds more than all the grains
of sand that exist, the universe and its development may in this way
certainly be comprehended. Thus according to Leibnitz every monad has
or is the representation of the entire universe, which is the same as
saying that it is really representation in general; but at the same time
it is a determinate representation, by means of which it comes to be
this particular monad, therefore it is representation according to its
particular situation and circumstances.[274]
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