Hegel's Philosophy of MindHegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich
Philosophy
Hegel's Philosophy of Mind
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich
Philosophy
glorification of the delights of intuition, remembrance, imagination. It
is true that even as isolated (i.e. as non-intelligent), intuition,
imagination, &c. can afford a certain satisfaction: what physical nature
succeeds in doing by its fundamental quality—its
out-of-selfness,—exhibiting the elements or factors of immanent reason
external to each other,—that the intelligence can do by voluntary act, but
the same result may happen where the intelligence is itself only natural
and untrained. But the _true satisfaction_, it is admitted, is only
afforded by an intuition permeated by intellect and mind, by rational
conception, by products of imagination which are permeated by reason and
exhibit ideas—in a word, by _cognitive_ intuition, cognitive conception,
&c. The truth ascribed to such satisfaction lies in this, that intuition,
conception, &c. are not isolated, and exist only as “moments” in the
totality of cognition itself.
(α) Intuition (Intelligent Perception)(136).
§ 446. The mind which as soul is physically conditioned,—which as
consciousness stands to this condition on the same terms as to an outward
object,—but which as intelligence _finds itself_ so characterised—is (1)
an inarticulate embryonic life, in which it is to itself as it were
palpable and has the whole _material_ of its knowledge. In consequence of
the immediacy in which it is thus originally, it is in this stage only as
an individual and possesses a vulgar subjectivity. It thus appears as mind
in the guise of _feeling_.
If feeling formerly turned up (§ 399) as a mode of the _soul’s_ existence,
the finding of it or its immediacy was in that case essentially to be
conceived as a congenital or corporeal condition; whereas at present it is
only to be taken abstractly in the general sense of immediacy.
§ 447. The characteristic form of feeling is that though it is a mode of
some “affection,” this mode is simple. Hence feeling, even should its
import be most sterling and true, has the form of casual
particularity,—not to mention that its import may also be the most scanty
and most untrue.
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