It is impossible, of course, to speak with confidence on such a subject. That Hannibal was thoroughly competent to judge of the situation from a soldier's point of view must be conceded. Nor is it difficult to see that, victorious as he had been, his available force must have been greatly reduced. His loss in killed is said to have been 6,000. The proportion of wounded in ancient warfare was far smaller than that which prevails under modern conditions. Still we must make a considerable addition if we would reckon the total of the disabled. He had about 55,000 on the morning of the battle, and could hardly have been able to put more than 30,000 in the fighting line at its close. He thought it better, under the circumstances, to wait for the results of his victory on those who both within and without Italy were watching the course of the war. These were not inconsiderable, but they were not as decisive as might have been expected. And Hannibal seems to have continued to hope for developments which never occurred. Perhaps we may say that it would have been wise to have abandoned the Italian campaign, if, six months after Cannæ, he still felt himself unable to march on Rome. This is one of the questions upon which the most sagacious of men and the ablest of generals may be mistaken. To abandon Italy would have been to give up the dream of his life, and to this Hannibal could not bring himself, even after it must have become evident to his cooler judgment that Rome was not to be vanquished. FOOTNOTES: [Footnote 21: He held important commands in subsequent years.] [Footnote 22: Not to be identified with any other officer of the same name, for, strangely enough, he is not mentioned on any other occasion.] [Footnote 23: His silence is certainly remarkable because he was certainly acquainted with Paullus' son, and was on terms of intimate friendship with his grandson. (The younger Scipio was a son of the Æmilius Paullus who conquered Macedonia, and was adopted by a son of the elder Scipio.)] VIII THE SECRET MARCH