The inference to be drawn from the records, the correspondence, the conversations and the writings of all the parties thereto, is that the representations of Butler, and especially his comments upon Smith's criticism of the battles and management of the campaign, were the principal factors in convincing Grant that the best way out of the complications was to relieve Smith and restore Butler to full command. This way had been foreseen and suggested by Smith himself for he had asked more than once to be relieved from further service in the field on account of ill health, which made it impossible for him to undergo exposure to the hot sun, but his request had been denied, doubtless from a sincere desire on Grant's part to have the advantages of his services in the solution of the complicated problem which yet confronted the army. Had this request been granted when made, or had it been granted afterwards, and placed on the ground of a personal favor for the benefit of his health, which might well have been done, General Smith has frankly admitted that he would have had no shadow of excuse for anything but thanks. But when he was relieved without notice or any assignment of cause, as he was starting on sick leave, and the order was concealed from him till he had returned, a suspicion at once arose in his mind as to the motives which inspired it, and the suspicion was claimed by him as a sufficient justification for telling the world all he knew in regard to those who were responsible for the action of which he complains. His military criticism, however indiscreet, had always been direct and manly. Its soundness had been approved by some of the best officers ill the service, including Grant himself, but it must be observed that the latter in his final report of the campaign, takes pains to make the point, evidently to forestall criticism, that he held himself responsible for only the general plans of the campaigns and operations, and that in accordance with an invariable habit, he left the details and the actual conduct of the battles to his subordinate commanders. The wisdom of this arrangement is not here in question, though much might be said against it. Its effect, if admitted, as a sound rule of action, must be to transfer the responsibility for a bloody and costly campaign to the shoulders of Meade, Humphreys, Burnside, Butler, Sheridan, Hunter, and in a number of cases even to those of corps and division commanders, instead of leaving it where it more justly belongs, on the shoulders of those who were responsible for the working organization of the army, and for the details of its staff arrangements.