judgment of approval or disapproval? If I am very rich, if my aim in life is to obtain momentary sensual pleasures, and I know that Rhenish wine will secure me one of them, I buy and drink Rhenish wine and approve my act. I am satisfied with myself. But if I do not _wish_ to indulge in gluttony, and if my money is all devoted to other purposes, for which I _wish_ as preferable, and if, in spite of this, yielding to the temptation of the moment, I buy and drink Rhenish wine, I have put myself into contradiction with myself, and the sensual pleasure will be followed by a judgment of disapproval, by a legitimate and fitting ECONOMIC REMORSE. To prove to you how, in all this, I omit every _moral_ consideration, I will give you another example: that of a knave who thinks it _ofelimo_ to himself to murder a man in order to rob him of a sum of money. At the moment of assassination, and although remaining a knave at heart, he yields to an emotion of fear or to a pathological feeling of compassion, and does not kill the man. Note carefully the terms of the hypothesis. The knave will call himself an ass and an imbecile, and will feel _remorse_ for his contradictory and inconclusive conduct; but not indeed a _moral_ remorse (of that he is, by hypothesis, incapable), but, precisely, a remorse that is merely _economic_. It seems to me that there is another confusion, easy to dispel, in your counter criticism to my criticism of the _scale of values_ (economic) you say that 'there is no need for one person to find himself at the same moment under different conditions; it is enough that he can _picture to himself_ these different conditions.' Can you in truth _picture yourself_ being _at the same moment_ under _different_ conditions? Fancy has its laws; and does not allow the imagination of what is unimaginable. You can easily say that you _picture_ it to yourself: words are docile; but, to picture it _in reality_, is, pardon me, another matter altogether. You will not succeed in it any more than I. Ask me to imagine a lion with the head of a donkey, and I will comply at once; but ask me to imagine a lion standing _at the same moment_ in two different places, and I cannot succeed. I will picture to myself, if you like, two similar lions, two exactly alike, but not the same in two different positions. Fancy reconstructs reality, but possible reality, not the impossible or what is contradictory. Thus my demonstration of the absurdity of the _scale of values_ applies both to actual and to possible reality. Nay, in discussing science in the abstract it was framed precisely on the mere consideration of the possible.