[208] Polycrates, tyrant of Samos, was remarkable for the favourable issue of all his undertakings. Amasis, king of Egypt, wrote thus to him: “It is pleasant to hear of the good fortune of a friend and connexion; but your extraordinary prosperity pleases not me, knowing, as I do, that the Deity is envious: and I would have those for whom I am interested meet both with success and failure, and think a chequered life better than unclouded fortune. For I have never heard of any man who, being prosperous in all things, has not at last perished miserably, root and branch. Be persuaded, then, and take this precaution against your good fortune; select whatever you have most valuable, and would most regret to lose, and so bestow this that it shall never come to man again; and if, in future, good and evil fortune are not blended, remedy it in the manner which I now propose.” Polycrates took the advice and cast into the sea an engraved gem of extraordinary value; and within a few days a fish was presented to him within which the gem was found. Amasis, hearing of it, renounced all friendship and connexion with him, as a man predestined to an evil fate. The event must have strongly confirmed the notion from which the advice proceeded; for Polycrates having given offence to the satrap of Sardis, or, as is more likely, being considered too powerful and dangerous a neighbour to remain on the Ionian coast, was entrapped into that nobleman’s power, and crucified by him.—Herod. iii. 40. [209] Scott, vol. vii. p. 215. [210] Segur, liv. vi. chap. 6. [211] Scott, p. 301. [212] It is curious that Kutusoff and Napoleon were actually retreating from Malo–Yarowslavitch, the scene of the battle, at the same moment; the one fearing another attack, the other despairing of success in forcing the position. [213] Segur, ix. 11 [214] During the whole retreat only one corps grounded arms to the enemy, and that not until it was surrounded and cut off from the main army, and reduced to extremity. This occurred just before the passage of the Beresina. [215] Segur, xi. 3 [216] Segur, xi. 5. [217] To get at the exact truth is no easy matter, even where the means of ascertaining it seem most ample. General Gourgaud, who also served in 1812, has published an elaborate criticism of the Comte de Segur’s work, in which he maintains that the difficulties and losses of the passage of the Beresina have been excessively exaggerated,—that the French had 250 guns, which commanded the opposite bank, and 45,000 men under arms,—and that of women and children, whom Segur is always fond of introducing, there were next to none. Throughout the narrative we have followed Segur’s account, as generally considered most authoritative, though he seems fond of writing for effect, and his accounts, as far as disparity of numbers in this latter part of the retreat is concerned, are somewhat startling. [218] Segur, xii. 2.