Historical Parallels, vol. 3 (of 3)Malkin, Arthur Thomas
History
Historical Parallels, vol. 3 (of 3)
Malkin, Arthur Thomas
History -- Popular works; World history -- Popular works
When Callicratidas heard that the Athenian fleet was at Samos, he left
fifty ships, commanded by Eteonicus, to maintain the siege, and put to
sea himself with 120. The Athenians spent that night at Arginusæ, a
cluster of islands between the southern promontory of Lesbos and the
main land. In the morning both parties put to sea: eight of the ten
Athenian generals were on board the fleet.
[Illustration:]
Xenophon tells us that the superiority in sailing, or rather rowing,
which had enabled the Athenians at the commencement of the war to gain
such distinguished successes under the command of Phormion and others,
was now reversed: and that from the greater swiftness of their ships,
the Lacedæmonians were more likely to profit by the rapid evolutions,
in which the naval science of that time was shown; especially that
called the diecplus, which seems to have consisted in dashing through
the enemy’s line, avoiding the direct shock of his beak, but sweeping
away his oars if possible by an oblique attack. To guard against
this danger the Athenians adopted the following disposition of their
fleet: in either wing were four squadrons, each of fifteen ships, and
each commanded by one of the generals, eight of whom were on board
the fleet, drawn up in a double line. The left of the centre was held
by ten Samian ships; then came ten Athenian ships, each containing a
military officer of rank, called taxiarch, which seems to correspond
in grade most closely to the rank of colonel; next to them, each in
his own ship, three navarchs or admirals, two of whom, Thrasybulus and
Theramenes, are names well known in the history of the time, and the
few allied ships, which were not elsewhere stationed. All these were in
single line. We have here a good illustration of the close connection
between the military and naval service, and may infer that officers
of distinction in the one were not expected to serve in inferior
situations in the other. The distribution of the fleet will be more
readily understood from the annexed diagram.
The Lacedæmonian fleet was formed in a single line.
Hermon of Megara, the pilot, or master rather of Callicratidas’s
ship, observed that the Athenians were much the most numerous, and
said that it would be well to retreat. Callicratidas answered, that
Sparta would not be worse inhabited if he were dead, but it was
shameful to run away. The battle lasted long; but when Callicratidas,
who led the Spartan right wing, was thrown overboard by the shock of
his own trireme against another, and the Athenian right wing gained
the advantage over their opponents, the Spartan fleet betook itself
to flight, with the loss of seventy ships or upwards. The victors
returned to their station at Arginusæ, their number diminished only by
twenty–five ships, but nearly all the crews of these had perished.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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