[194] Solon appointed a set of officers, ten in number, who were called _ῥέτορες_, speakers, to argue and explain to the people the merits of public questions, for a certain fee. Their qualifications were to be made the subject of a very close inquiry, according to his laws. Whether in later times the appellation was confined to these recognized speakers, or whether all who were ready to speak and plead causes, as Lysias, Isocrates, &c., were so called, the author has not been able to ascertain to his satisfaction; but he believes the latter to be the case, which is not incompatible with the term still retaining its special meaning, as the title of an officer. Demosthenes calls himself a _ῥέτωρ_ (De Cor. 301). In later times they acquired much more importance. Demosthenes was a sort of prime minister. In his time, he says, the orators and generals ran in couples; one to plan and defend, the other to perform (_ῥέτωρ ἡγεμὼν, καὶ στρατηγὸς ὡπὸ τούτῳ_, De Rep. Ord., 173). In earlier times, on the contrary, all the leaders in Athens were men of action, Themistocles, Cimon, Pericles, &c., down to Nicias and Alcibiades, though most of them cultivated eloquence at the same time. Even Cleon thought it necessary to pretend to military renown. [195] The passage of Ælian (iii., 17), quoted both by Mitford and Mitchell, as giving the true solution of the cause of Socrates’ death, contains no solution at all of that problem: it merely tells us, what we knew on better authority, that Socrates did not like democracy. Xenophon, Mem. i., c. 2, does more to support this opinion; for he states distinctly that the avowed dislike of Socrates to the practice of choosing magistrates by lot, the bad character of his pupils Alcibiades and Critias, and his alleged perversion of passages in the poets, to teach his pupils “to be evil–doers and supporters of tyrannies,” were topics insisted on by his accusers in the speech for the prosecution. Nor is it improbable that such topics had their weight with many in the multitude of judges who composed the court, a body too numerous to discriminate and weigh evidence. [196] Apol., c. x., part i., vol. ii., p. 103, ed., Bekker.