Before attending directly to these questions, it is best to consider whether it is possible to compare the subjective costs of commodities produced by different persons or groups of persons. A ton of coal may exchange for six bushels of wheat. The subjective cost of the coal consists chiefly in the labor of certain miners; that of the wheat in the labor of certain farmers. To assert that the subjective costs of production of these commodities either are or are not in proportion to their respective exchange values, implies that we are able to compare these costs as quantities. To assert proportionality requires that we be able to say that the disutility experienced by the miners in producing a ton of coal is equal to that experienced by the farmers in producing six bushels of wheat. To assert disproportionality, we must be able to state that these disutilities are unequal. If these disutilities are quite incommensurable, we can assert nothing regarding the relation of these costs to the corresponding exchange values.[249] Men as scholars are accustomed to maintain that the pleasures or pains of different minds cannot be compared as quantities, while in every-day life the same men are equally accustomed to state that John _enjoys_ music _more_ than Paul, or that Primus _suffers more_ or works _harder_ than Secundus. May or may not we affirm that the stoker works harder, or in our own jargon, suffers more disutility, than the dining-room steward? In the hope of settling part of the issues raised in these questions, let us consider the meaning of one of Adam Smith’s statements regarding wages in different employments. I refer to the doctrine that wages tend to be higher than the average in employments where there is a higher degree of disutility. This tendency is operative only under perfect competition, and the existence of numerous non-competing groups occasions a result much changed from that to be expected from this tendency, which is sometimes described in the “evil paradox” that the harder the work, the lower the wages. The question which concerns us here is, how much does either of the above statements imply with respect to the possibility of comparing the pains or pleasures of different persons. It seems to the writer that neither necessitates a direct quantitative comparison of the subjective experiences of different persons. I may, perhaps, say that the persons in occupation A are suffering more disutility and receiving higher wages than those in employment B, but all I can be supposed really to know is that if I were in occupation A, I would suffer more discomfort than if I were in occupation B. If I am a person of “average” (_i. e._, typical) constitution, I may infer legitimately that this is true also of any average person. While making no affirmation that John suffers more disutility than Paul, either when these persons are in the same or in different employments;[250] we may be able to state