In the judgment of the writer, the best definition of esteem value is “the significance (_Bedeutung_) which concrete goods attain in our estimation when we realize that we are _dependent_ upon them for the satisfaction of some want.” This is a loose translation of the definition formulated by Carl Menger in 1871.[214] The individual good attains value not simply when it is capable of affording us satisfaction, but when it _conditions_ the satisfaction. Goods existing in superfluity give satisfactions but do not _condition_ them, hence any unit of such goods possesses no value. The removal or destruction of a unit occasions the loss of no satisfaction. Menger’s definition was a triumph of theory in stating the relation of value to human satisfaction and to utility. The law of marginal utility is but a corollary of the principle involved in this definition. The utility of a good is its power to afford satisfaction.[215] When goods occur in stocks of like units the phenomenon of “marginal” utility emerges. As the stock of such goods to be used by a consumer within a given time is increased, the satisfaction afforded by each successive unit declines.[216] The actual utility of each successive increment is lower than the actual utility of the preceding increment. The actual utility of the last or marginal increment is the “marginal” utility of any of the increments. The reason why the value of any such increment is determined at the height of its “marginal” utility is only because any one increment conditions merely the satisfaction afforded by the last or marginal increment. Remove or destroy any increment and rationally only the satisfaction of the marginal increment will be given up. In effect any increment is the marginal one. Thus the law of marginal utility is not the fundamental law of value. Menger’s definition contains this fundamental law and gives a universal principle of value. The theorem that value depends upon marginal utility is merely a deduction from this fundamental principle, and is of limited scope, since it applies only where there are goods in stocks.[217] An absolutely essential point to be kept in mind is that the value of an object is not derived from the sacrifice made to obtain it. On the contrary we make the sacrifice because the object has this value. The value is first, the sacrifice second. The only means of estimating how much sacrifice or discomfort we can afford to undergo to obtain an object is by judging its value to us _previously_ to and _independently_ of the sacrifice. If the labor cost, say, determined the value, we could expend labor cost regardlessly in producing any objects whatsoever. But this is just what we cannot do. We must have a care when we expend labor. A care for what? For the value of the result. The value of the object is derived from the satisfaction which it can afford, but it is attributed to the object only when it is the indispensable condition of that satisfaction.