[448] For the ethics of Greek slavery consult Schmidt, _Die Ethik der alten Griechen_ (1882), Bd. ii, S. 203–219. [449] Thebes, but not from moral scruples seemingly, prohibited under the penalty of death the destruction of healthy infants. [450] The reader of Plato will recall how Socrates uses this practice of the exposition of infants to illustrate his art of bringing to birth true and false ideas (“lies and shadows”) in the minds of his pupils, and exposing to die those that are vain shadows. See his _Dialogues_, tr. Jowett, vol. iii, pp. 350 f. [451] The practice of the exposition of female infants in the Hellenistic Age, when luxury increased and children became a burden, seems to have been more common than in earlier times. [452] Mahaffy, _Social Life in Greece_ (1888), p. 120. [453] _Politics_, vi. 4, sec. 12. This contempt for tradesmen and laborers, generally speaking, continued through all periods of Greek history. In some states, however, particularly in Athens, it underwent modification. “The later Athenians began to consider trade an honorable road to riches, and aristocrats like Nicias were known as careful trade masters.” In Rhodes, also, trade became honorable. [454] Paulsen, _System of Ethics_, tr. Thilly, p. 62 n. [455] _Laws_, tr. Jowett, xi. 919. [456] They were charged with adulteration of foods, cheating in measure, etc. Demosthenes declares that a man honest in commercial transactions was a prodigy. Cf. Mahaffy, _Social Life in Greece_ (1888), p. 419. [457] See above, p. 89. [458] This ethical feeling is to be reckoned with in dealing with Asiatics--until there is a change in their ideal of manliness. The overlooking of an injury is apt to be regarded by them as an indication of weakness and cowardice. [459] Schmidt, _Die Ethik der alten Griechen_ (1882), Bd. ii, S. 312. [460] _Herod._ vi. 24. The Delphian oracle tried to cure this defect in the national character. See the story of Glaucus, _Herod._ vi. 86. [461] _Die Ethik der alten Griechen_ (1882), Bd. ii, S. 413. [462] _Ethics_, tr. Welldon, i. 4. [463] _Ethics: the Facts of the Moral Life_ (1908), p. 95. [464] _Od._ xix. 396–398. [465] _Thucyd._ i. 5. [466] _Il._ xxii. 485–499. [467] See Xen. _Mem._ ii. 1, 21, for the parable, by the Sophist Prodicus, of the choice of Heracles at the parting of the ways. [468] _The Republic_, iii. 386–392. [469] See above, p. 35. [470] “The blessed islands of the West were indeed even then [in the Homeric Age] a home for the dead, but they had not yet been opened to moral worth, as in the days of Pindar.”--MAHAFFY, _Social Life in Greece_ (1888), p. 26. [471] See Zeller, _History of Philosophy_ (1881), vol. i, p. 125, and Schmidt, _Die Ethik der alten Griechen_ (1882), Bd. i, S. 99. “Strictly speaking,” says Professor Seymour, “Homer knows of no instance of rewards, and of only one case of punishment after death” (_Life in the Homeric Age_ (1908), p. 469).