and which, lying in the line of communication between Silistria and Varna, was important to the Russians as the means of keeping open a communication between the army of General Roth near Varna and the troops destined to act upon Silistria. Redschid Pasha, who on being recalled from Greece had been appointed Grand Vizier, had arrived at Schumla on the 21st of March, and on perceiving the position of the invading army, formed the well-conceived design of attacking Pravadi and the force under General Roth. … This movement of the Vizier became immediately known to General Roth, who by means of a courier conveyed information of it to Count Diebitch. That General was too acute not to perceive the purpose of his adversary, and too enterprising not to endeavour immediately to take advantage of it. The Count therefore adopted a movement of the highest importance, and which, indeed, had the effect of deciding the campaign. Instead of marching to attack Redschid Pasha at Pravadi, he resolved to intercept his communication with the fortress he had quitted, and thus compel the Ottoman general either to come to a general engagement, which could hardly fail to result to the advantage of the Russians, or to fight his way towards Schumla through the Russian army, or leave the fortress of Schumla to its fate, which, feebly garrisoned as it was, could not be long delayed. This skilful manœuvre was no sooner resolved upon than it was carried into execution. … While the Russian force were rapidly advancing towards Koulevscha, a village between Pravadi and Schumla, and scarcely three miles from the latter, the Grand Vizier remained wholly ignorant of the fact that Diebitch had quitted Silistria, and persisted in the belief that the only opponents of his retreat to Schumla were Generals Roth and Rudiger. … The mistake was fatal. The Ottoman cavalry attacked the infantry of the Russians, who were overwhelmed by their charge; and Diebitch, having waited in expectation that the Vizier would descend from the eminence on which he was posted to complete his supposed victory, and finding that he did not make this movement, broke from his concealment among the hills, and suddenly attacked the Ottoman troops with his whole force. The effect was instantaneous. A universal panic seized the Vizier's forces, his cavalry and infantry fled in confusion, every attempt to bring them to a stand proved abortive, and he himself escaped with difficulty. The artillery and baggage all fell into the hands of the enemy. … The muster at Schumla on the return of the Vizier and his remaining troops exhibited the magnitude of their loss. Out of a fine army of 40,000 men, who a few days before had marched from the fortress full of confidence, only 12,000 foot and about 6,000 cavalry remained. After the fatal battle of