While the British Minister at Peking was securing these assurances from the Tsung-li Yamên, concerning the non-alienation of the Yang-tsze region and the opening of inland waters to steam navigation, the Russian Minister was equally busy, extorting a cession or lease of Port Arthur and Talienwan, with privileges of railway construction through neighboring territory which gave immense value to those acquisitions. The probability of his success was soon known to the British authorities, who made no serious objection to the leasing of Talienwan, but were strongly opposed to a Russian occupation of Port Arthur. {87} On the 22d of March, 1898, Lord Salisbury wrote to the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg: "Her Majesty's Government on their part would not regard with any dissatisfaction the lease by Russia of an ice-free commercial harbour, connected by rail with the trans-Siberian Railway which is now under construction. Questions of an entirely different kind are opened if Russia obtains control of a military port in the neighbourhood of Peking. Port Arthur is useless for commercial purposes, its whole importance being derived solely from its military strength and strategic position, and its occupation would inevitably be considered in the East as a standing menace to Peking and the commencement of the partition of China." On the 28th of March he wrote again: "Port Arthur is not a commercial harbour. It is doubtful whether it could be converted into one. It is certain that, even if such a project were possible, it could never be worth while for the owners or lessees of Talienwan to embark upon it. But though not a commercial harbour, Port Arthur supplies a naval base, limited indeed in extent, but possessing great natural and artificial strength. And this, taken in connection with its strategic position, gives it an importance in the Gulf of Pechili and therefore at Peking, upon which, in their representations to Japan at the close of the war with China, the Russian Government laid the greatest emphasis. It is from this last point of view that the occupation of Port Arthur chiefly concerns Her Majesty's Government. It is not because a position which can easily be made a naval arsenal of great strength has been acquired by Russia that they regret its occupation by that Power. It is because the possession, even if temporary, of this particular position, is likely to have political consequences at Peking of great international importance, and because the acquisition of a Chinese harbour notoriously useless for commercial purposes by a foreign Power will be universally interpreted in the Far East as indicating that the partition of China has begun.