hybrids, for Linnaeus, when he wrote the ‘Fundamenta,’ knew of none except the mule; hybrids in plants were first described by Koelreuter in 1761, and these Linnaeus nowhere mentions; and what amount of proof can be drawn from the vegetable hybrids, which Linnaeus afterwards supposed himself to have observed, but which were no hybrids, we shall see in the history of the sexual theory; here we need only remark that he arrives at the existence of these hybrids from the idea of sexuality exactly as he arrived at that of sexuality from the idea of hybridisation. Then he goes on with his demonstration; ‘that an egg germinates without fecundation is denied by experience, and this must hold good therefore of the eggs[30] of plants—every plant is provided with flower and fruit, even where these are not visible to the eye’; with Linnaeus, of course, this is logically concluded from the conception of the plant or of the ‘ovum’; he alleges indeed certain observations as well, but they are incorrect. He continues, ‘The fructification consists of the sexual organs of the flowers; that the anthers are the male organs, the pollen the fertilising matter, is proved by their nature, further by the fact that the flower precedes the fruit, as also by their position, the time, the loculaments (anthers), by castration, and by the structure of the pollen.’ Here too the main point with Linnaeus is the nature of the male organs, and that we may know what this nature is he refers to a former paragraph, where we learn that the essence of the flower is in the anthers and stigma. Almost all his demonstrations consist of such reasonings in a circle and in arguing from the thing to be proved. And while the passages quoted show how much he did for the doctrine of sexuality, we find this sophistical style of reasoning still more copiously displayed in the essay entitled ‘Sponsalia Plantarum’ in the ‘Amoenitates’ (i. p. 77), and in a worse form still in the essay, ‘Plantae Hybridae’ (Amoen. iii. p. 29). That Linnaeus had not the remotest conception of the way in which the truth of a hypothetical fact is proved on the principles of strict inductive investigation is shown by these and many other examples, and by his enquiry into the seeds of mosses (Amoen. ii. p. 266), upon which he prided himself not a little, but which is really inconceivably bad even for that time (1750). It was not Linnaeus’ habit to occupy himself with what we should call an enquiry; whatever escaped the first critical glance he left quietly alone; it did not occur to him to examine into the causes of the phenomena that interested him; he classified them and had done with them; as for instance in his ‘Somnus Plantarum,’ as he called the periodical movements of plants. We cannot read much of the ‘Philosophia Botanica’ or the ‘Amoenitates’ without feeling that we are transported into the literature of the middle ages by the kind of scholastic sophistry which is all that his argumentation