History of European Morals From Augustus to Charlemagne (Vol. 1 of 2)Lecky, William Edward Hartpole
Philosophy
History of European Morals From Augustus to Charlemagne (Vol. 1 of 2)
Lecky, William Edward Hartpole
Ethics; Europe -- Moral conditions
When the savage looks around upon the world and begins to form his
theories of existence, he falls at once into three great errors, which
become the first principles of his subsequent opinions. He believes that
this earth is the centre of the universe, and that all the bodies
encircling it are intended for its use; that the disturbances and
dislocations it presents, and especially the master curse of death, are
connected with some event in his history, and also that the numerous
phenomena and natural vicissitudes he sees around him are due to direct
and isolated volitions, either of spirits presiding over, or of
intelligences inherent in, matter. Around these leading conceptions a
crowd of particular legends speedily cluster. If a stone falls beside him,
he naturally infers that some one has thrown it. If it be an aërolite, it
is attributed to some celestial being. Believing that each comet, tempest,
or pestilence results from a direct and isolated act, he proceeds to make
theories regarding the motives that have induced his spiritual persecutors
to assail him, and the methods by which he may assuage their anger.
Finding numerous distinct trains or series of phenomena, he invents for
each appropriate presiding spirits. Miracles are to him neither strange
events nor violations of natural law, but simply the unveiling or
manifestation of the ordinary government of the world.
With these broad intellectual conceptions several minor influences concur.
A latent fetichism, which is betrayed in that love of direct
personification, or of applying epithets derived from sentient beings to
inanimate nature, which appears so largely in all poetry and eloquence,
and especially in those of an early period of society, is the root of a
great part of our opinions. If—to employ a very familiar illustration—the
most civilised and rational of mankind will observe his own emotions, when
by some accident he has struck his head violently against a door-post, he
will probably find that his first exclamation was not merely of pain but
of anger, and of anger directed against the wood. In a moment reason
checks the emotion; but if he observes carefully his own feelings, he may
easily convince himself of the unconscious fetichism which, is latent in
his mind, and which, in the case of a child or a savage, displays itself
without reserve. Man instinctively ascribes volition to whatever
powerfully affects him. The feebleness of his imagination conspires with
other causes to prevent an uncivilised man from rising above the
conception of an anthropomorphic Deity, and the capricious or isolated
acts of such a being form his exact notion of miracles. The same
feebleness of imagination makes him clothe all intellectual tendencies,
all conflicting emotions, all forces, passions, or fancies, in material
forms. His mind naturally translates the conflict between opposing
feelings into a history of the combat between rival spirits. A vast
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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