40 See a collection of passages from Aristotle, bearing on the subject, in Mackintosh’s _Dissertation_. 41 Cic. _De Finibus_, i. 5. This view is adopted in Tucker’s _Light of Nature_ (ed. 1842), vol. i. p. 167. See, too, Mill’s _Analysis of the Human Mind_, vol. ii. p. 174. _ 42 Essay_, book ii. ch. xxxiii. 43 Hutcheson _On the Passions_, § 1. The “secondary desires” of Hutcheson are closely related to the “reflex affections” of Shaftesbury. “Not only the outward beings which offer themselves to the sense are the objects of the affection; but the very actions themselves, and the affections of pity, kindness, gratitude, and their contraries, being brought into the mind by reflection, become objects. So that by means of this reflected sense, there arises another kind of affection towards those very affections themselves.”—Shaftesbury’s _Enquiry concerning Virtue_, book i. part ii. § 3. 44 See the preface to Hartley _On Man_. Gay’s essay is prefixed to Law’s translation of Archbishop King _On the Origin of Evil_. 45 “The case is this. We first perceive or imagine some real good; i.e. fitness to promote our happiness in those things which we love or approve of.... Hence those things and pleasures are so tied together and associated in our minds, that one cannot present itself, but the other will also occur. And the association remains even after that which at first gave them the connection is quite forgotten, or perhaps does not exist, but the contrary.”—Gay’s _Essay_, p. lii. “All affections whatsoever are finally resolvable into reason, pointing out private happiness, and are conversant only about things apprehended to be means tending to this end; and whenever this end is not perceived, they are to be accounted for from the association of ideas, and may properly enough be called habits.”—Ibid. p. xxxi.