History of European Morals From Augustus to Charlemagne (Vol. 1 of 2)Lecky, William Edward Hartpole
Philosophy
History of European Morals From Augustus to Charlemagne (Vol. 1 of 2)
Lecky, William Edward Hartpole
Ethics; Europe -- Moral conditions
This change is but one of several influences which, as civilisation
advances, diminish the spirit of reverence among mankind. Reverence is one
of those feelings which, in utilitarian systems, would occupy at best a
very ambiguous position; for it is extremely questionable whether the
great evils that have grown out of it in the form of religious
superstition and political servitude have not made it a source of more
unhappiness than happiness. Yet, however doubtful may be its position if
estimated by its bearing on happiness and on progress, there are few
persons who are not conscious that no character can attain a supreme
degree of excellence in which a reverential spirit is wanting. Of all the
forms of moral goodness it is that to which the epithet beautiful may be
most emphatically applied. Yet the habits of advancing civilisation are,
if I mistake not, on the whole inimical to its growth. For reverence grows
out of a sense of constant dependence. It is fostered by that condition of
religions thought in which men believe that each incident that befalls
them is directly and specially ordained, and when every event is therefore
fraught with a moral import. It is fostered by that condition of
scientific knowledge in which every portentous natural phenomenon is
supposed to be the result of a direct divine interposition, and awakens in
consequence emotions of humility and awe. It is fostered in that stage of
political life when loyalty or reverence for the sovereign is the
dominating passion, when an aristocracy, branching forth from the throne,
spreads habits of deference and subordination through every village, when
a revolutionary, a democratic, and a sceptical spirit are alike unknown.
Every great change, either of belief or of circumstances, brings with it a
change of emotions. The self-assertion of liberty, the levelling of
democracy, the dissecting-knife of criticism, the economical revolutions
that reduce the relations of classes to simple contracts, the
agglomeration of population, and the facilities of locomotion that sever
so many ancient ties, are all incompatible with the type of virtue which
existed before the power of tradition was broken, and when the chastity of
faith was yet unstained. Benevolence, uprightness, enterprise,
intellectual honesty, a love of freedom, and a hatred of superstition are
growing around us, but we look in vain for that most beautiful character
of the past, so distrustful of self, and so trustful of others, so simple,
so modest, and so devout, which even when, Ixion-like, it bestowed its
affections upon a cloud, made its very illusions the source of some of the
purest virtues of our nature. In a few minds, the contemplation of the
sublime order of nature produces a reverential feeling, but to the great
majority of mankind it is an incontestable though mournful fact, that the
discovery of controlling and unchanging law deprives phenomena of their
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account