[218] The statement of Plutarch, that Solon gave an appeal from the decision of the archon to the judgment of the popular dikastery (Plutarch, Solon, 18), is distrusted by most of the expositors, though Dr. Thirlwall seems to admit it, justifying it by the analogy of the ephetæ, or judges of appeal, constituted by Drako (Hist. of Greece, vol. ii, ch. xi, p. 46). To me it appears that the Drakonian ephetæ were not really judges in _appeal_: but be that as it may, the supposition of an appeal from the judgment of the archon is inconsistent with the known course of Attic procedure, and has apparently arisen in Plutarch’s mind from confusion with the Roman _provocatio_, which really was an appeal from the judgment of the consul to that of the people. Plutarch’s comparison of Solon with Publicola leads to this suspicion,—Καὶ τοῖς φεύγουσι δίκη, ἐπικαλεῖσθαι τὸν δῆμον, ὥσπερ ὁ Σόλων τοὺς δικαστὰς, ἔδωκε (Publicola). The Athenian archon was first a judge without appeal; and afterwards, ceasing to be a judge, he became president of a dikastery, performing only those preparatory steps which brought the case to an issue fit for decision: but he does not seem ever to have been a judge subject to appeal. It is hardly just to Plutarch to make him responsible for the absurd remark that Solon rendered his laws intentionally obscure, in order that the dikasts might have more to do and greater power: he gives the remark, himself, only with the saving expression λέγεται, “it is said;” and we may well doubt whether it was ever seriously intended even by its author, whoever he may have been.