Both Aristotle (Polit. ii, 9, 9) and Dêmosthenês (contr. Euerg. et Mnêsibul. c. 18, p. 1161) call the ordinances of Drako νόμοι, not θεσμοί. Andokidês distinguishes the θεσμοὶ of Drako and the νόμοι of Solon (De Mysteriis, p. 11). This is the adoption of a phrase comparatively modern; Solon called his own laws θεσμοί. The oath of the περίπολοι ἔφηβοι (the youth who formed the armed police of Attica during the first two years of their military age), as given in Pollux (viii, 106), seems to contain at least many ancient phrases: this phrase,—καὶ τοῖς θεσμοῖς τοῖς ἱδρυμένοις πείσομαι,—is remarkable, as it indicates the ancient association of religious sanction which adhered to the word θεσμοί; for ἱδρύεσθαι is the word employed in reference to the establishment and domiciliation of the gods who protected the country,—θέσθαι νόμους is the later expression for making laws. Compare Stobæus De Republic. xliii, 48, ed. Gaisford, and Dêmosthen. cont. Makartat. c. 13, p. 1069. In the later and better-known times of Athenian law, we find these archons deprived in great measure of their powers of judging and deciding, and restricted to the task of first hearing the parties and collecting the evidence, next, of introducing the matter for trial into the appropriate dikastery, over which they presided. Originally, there was no separation of powers: the archons both judged and administered, sharing among themselves those privileges which had once been united in the hands of the king, and probably accountable at the end of their year of office to the senate of areopagus. It is probable also, that the functions of that senate, and those of the prytanes of the naukrars, were of the same double and confused nature. All of these functionaries belonged to the eupatrids, and all of them doubtless acted more or less in the narrow interest of their order: moreover, there was ample room for favoritism, in the way of connivance as well as antipathy, on the part of the archons. That such was decidedly the case, and that discontent began to be serious, we may infer from the duty imposed on the thesmothet Drako, B. C. 624, to put in writing the thesmoi, or ordinances, so that they might be “shown publicly,” and known beforehand.[128] He did not meddle with the political constitution, and in his ordinances Aristotle finds little worthy of remark except the extreme severity[129] of the punishments awarded: petty thefts, or even proved idleness of life, being visited with death or disfranchisement. [128] Ὅτε θεσμὸς ~ἐφάνη ὅδε~,—such is the exact expression of Solon’s law (Plutarch, Solon, c. 19); the word θεσμὸς is found in Solon’s own poems, θεσμοὺς δ᾽ ὁμοίους τῷ κακῷ τε κἀγαθῷ. [129] Aristot. Polit. ii, 9, 9; Rhetoric. ii. 25, 1; Aulus Gell. N. A. xi, 18; Pausanias, ix, 36, 4; Plutarch, Solon, c. 19; though Pollux (viii, 42) does not agree with him. Taylor, Lectt. Lysiacæ, ch. 10.