O. Müller (Dissertation on the Eumenides of Æschylus, p. 222, Eng. Transl.) says: “On no occasion does Zeus Soter exert his influence directly, like Apollo, Minerva, and the Erinnyes; but whereas Apollo is prophet and exegetes by virtue of wisdom derived from him, and Minerva is indebted to him for her sway over states and assemblies,—nay, the very Erinnyes exercise their functions in his name,—this Zeus stands always in the background, and has in reality only to settle a conflict existing within himself. For with Æschylus, as with all men of profound feeling among the Greeks from the earliest times, Jupiter is the only real god, in the higher sense of the word. Although he is, in the spirit of ancient theology, a generated god, arisen out of an imperfect state of things, and not produced till the third stage of a development of nature,—still he is, at the time we are speaking of, the spirit that pervades and governs the universe.” To the same purpose Klausen expresses himself (Theologumena Æschyli, pp. 6-69). It is perfectly true that many passages may be produced from Greek authors which ascribe to Zeus the supreme power here noted. But it is equally true that this conception is not uniformly adhered to, and that sometimes the Fates, or Mœræ are represented as supreme; occasionally represented as the stronger and Zeus as the weaker (Promêtheus, 515). The whole tenor of that tragedy, in fact, brings out the conception of a Zeus τύραννος,—whose power is not supreme, even for the time; and is not destined to continue permanently, even at its existing height. The explanations given by Klausen of this drama appear to me incorrect; nor do I understand how it is to be reconciled with the above passage quoted from O. Müller. The two oracles here cited from Herodotus exhibit plainly the fluctuation of Greek opinion on this subject: in the one, the supreme determination, and the inexorability which accompanies it, are ascribed to Zeus,—in the other, to the Mœræ. This double point of view adapted itself to different occasions, and served as a help for the interpretation of different events. Zeus was supposed to have certain sympathies for human beings; misfortunes happened to various men which he not only did not wish to bring on, but would have been disposed to avert; here the Mœræ, who had no sympathies, were introduced as an explanatory cause, tacitly implied as overruling Zeus. “Cum Furiis Æschylus Parcas tantum non ubique conjungit,” says Klausen (Theol. Æsch. p. 39); and this entire absence of human sympathies constitutes the common point of both,—that in which the Mœræ and the Erinnyes differ from all the other gods,—πέφρικα τὰν ὠλεσίοικον θεὰν, οὐ θεοῖς ὁμοίαν (Æschyl. Sept. ad Theb. 720): compare Eumenid. 169, 172, and, indeed, the general strain of that fearful tragedy.