which Boeckh puts upon this passage, in opposition to Platner and Schömann (Boeckh, Public Econ. of Athens, book iii, ch. xvi, p. 403, Eng. transl.; Schömann, Der Attisch. Prozess, p. 778; Platner, Prozess und Klagen bei den Attikern, ch. iv, 2, pp. 110-112, where the latter discusses both the passages of Antipho and Thucydidês). The passages in Demosthenês Orat. de Halones. c. 3, pp. 98, 99; and Andokidês cont. Alkibiad. c. 7, p. 121 (I quote this latter oration, though it is undoubtedly spurious, because we may well suppose the author of it to be conversant with the nature and contents of ξύμβολα), give us a sufficient idea of these judicial conventions, or ξύμβολα,—special and liable to differ in each particular case. They seem to me essentially distinct from that systematic scheme of proceeding whereby the dikasteries of Athens were made cognizant of all, or most, important controversies among or between the allied cities, as well as of political accusations. M. Boeckh draws a distinction between the _autonomous_ allies (Chios and Lesbos, at the time immediately before the Peloponnesian war) and the _subject_-allies: “the former class (he says) retained possession of unlimited jurisdiction, whereas the latter were compelled to try all their disputes in the courts of Athens.” Doubtless this distinction would prevail to a certain degree, but how far it was pushed we can hardly say. Suppose that a dispute took place between Chios and one of the subject islands, or between an individual Chian and an individual Thasian; would not the Chian plaintiff sue, or the Chian defendant be sued, before the Athenian dikastery? Suppose that an Athenian citizen or officer became involved in dispute with a Chian, would not the Athenian dikastery be the competent court, whichever of the two were plaintiff or defendant? Suppose a Chian citizen or magistrate to be suspected of fomenting revolt, would it not be competent to any accuser, either Chian or Athenian, to indict him before the dikastery at Athens? Abuse of power, or peculation, committed by Athenian officers at Chios, must of course be brought before the Athenian dikasteries, just as much as if the crime had been committed at Thasos or Naxos. We have no evidence to help us in regard to these questions; but I incline to believe that the difference in respect to judicial arrangement, between the autonomous and the subject-allies, was less in degree than M. Boeckh believes. We must recollect that the arrangement was not all pure hardship to the allies,—the liability to be prosecuted was accompanied with the privilege of prosecuting for injuries received.