We must remark that the tremendous catastrophe and loss of blood in
Sicily had abated the energy of the Athenian character generally,
but especially had made them despair of their foreign relations; of
the possibility that they could make head against enemies, increased
in number by revolts among their own allies, and farther sustained
by Persian gold. Upon this sentiment of despair is brought to bear
the treacherous delusion of Alkibiadês, offering them the Persian
aid; that is, means of defence and success against foreign enemies,
at the price of their democracy. Reluctantly the people are brought,
but they _are_ brought, to entertain the proposition: and thus the
conspirators gain their first capital point, of familiarizing the
people with the idea of such a change of constitution. The ulterior
success of the conspiracy—when all prospect of Persian gold, or
improved foreign position, was at an end—is due to the combinations,
alike nefarious and skilful, of Antiphon, wielding and organizing
the united strength of the aristocratical classes at Athens;
strength always exceedingly great, but under ordinary circumstances
working in fractions disunited and even reciprocally hostile to each
other,—restrained by the ascendant democratical institutions,—and
reduced to corrupt what it could not overthrow. Antiphon, about to
employ this anti-popular force in one systematic scheme, and for the
accomplishment of a predetermined purpose, keeps still within the
same ostensible constitutional limits. He raises no open mutiny:
he maintains inviolate the cardinal point of Athenian political
morality, respect to the decision of the senate and political
assembly, as well as to constitutional maxims. But he knows well that
the value of these meetings, as political securities, depends upon
entire freedom of speech; and that, if that freedom be suppressed,
the assembly itself becomes a nullity, or rather an instrument of
positive imposture and mischief. Accordingly, he causes all the
popular orators to be successively assassinated, so that no man
dares to open his mouth on that side; while on the other hand, the
anti-popular speakers are all loud and confident, cheering one
another on, and seeming to represent all the feeling of the persons
present. By thus silencing each individual leader, and intimidating
every opponent from standing forward as spokesman, he extorts the
formal sanction of the assembly and the senate to measures which
the large majority of the citizens detest. That majority, however,
are bound by their own constitutional forms; and when the decision
of these, by whatever means obtained, is against them, they have
neither the inclination nor the courage to resist. In no part of the
world has this sentiment of constitutional duty, and submission to
the vote of a legal majority, been more keenly and universally felt,
than it was among the citizens of democratical Athens.[53] Antiphon
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