Such was the dissection or cutting into parts of the ancient city
Mantinea; one of the most odious acts of high-handed Spartan
despotism. Its true character is veiled by the partiality of the
historian, who recounts it with a confident assurance, that after
the trouble of moving was over, the population felt themselves
decidedly bettered by the change. Such an assurance is only to be
credited, on the ground that, being captives under the Grecian laws
of war, they may have been thankful to escape the more terrible
liabilities of death or personal slavery, at the price of forfeiting
their civic community. That their feelings towards the change were
those of genuine aversion, is shown by their subsequent conduct after
the battle of Leuktra. As soon as the fear of Sparta was removed,
they flocked together, with unanimous impulse, to reconstitute and
refortify their dismantled city.[94] It would have been strange
indeed had the fact been otherwise; for attachment to a civic
community was the strongest political instinct of the Greek mind.
The citizen of a town was averse—often most unhappily averse—to
compromise the separate and autonomous working of his community
by joining in any larger political combination, however equitably
framed, and however it might promise on the whole an increase of
Hellenic dignity. But still more vehemently did he shrink from the
idea of breaking up his town into separate villages, and exchanging
the character of a citizen for that of a villager, which was nothing
less than great social degradation, in the eyes of Greeks generally,
Spartans not excepted.[95]
[94] This is mentioned by Xenophon himself (Hellen. vi, 5,
3). The Lacedæmonians, though they remonstrated against it,
were at that time too much humiliated to interfere by force
and prevent it. The reason why they did not interfere by force
(according to Xenophon) was that a general peace had just then
been sworn, guaranteeing autonomy to every distinct town, so
that the Mantineans under this peace had a right to do what
they did—στρατεύειν γε μέντοι ἐπ’ αὐτοὺς οὐ δυνατὸν ἐδόκει
εἶναι, ἐπ’ αὐτονομίᾳ τῆς εἰρήνης γεγενημένης (vi, 5, 5). Of
this second peace, Athens was the originator and the voucher;
but the autonomy which it guaranteed was only the same as had
been professedly guaranteed by the peace of Antalkidas, of which
Sparta had been the voucher.
General autonomy, as interpreted by Athens, was a different thing
from general autonomy as it had been when interpreted by Sparta.
The Spartans, when they had in their own hands both the power
of interpretation and the power of enforcement, did not scruple
to falsify autonomy so completely as to lay siege to Mantinea
and break up the city by force; while, when interpretation and
enforcement had passed to Athens, they at once recognized that
the treaty precluded them from a much less violent measure of
interference.
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