In proportion as Athens came to act more for her own separate
aggrandizement, and less for interests common to the whole
confederacy, the adherence of the larger confederate states
grew more and more reluctant. But what contributed yet farther
to detach them from Athens, was, the behavior of her armaments
on service, consisting in great proportion of mercenaries,
scantily and irregularly paid; whose disorderly and rapacious
exaction, especially at the cost of the confederates of Athens,
are characterized in strong terms by all the contemporary
orators—Demosthenes, Æschines, Isokrates, etc. The commander, having
no means of paying his soldiers, was often compelled to obey their
predatory impulses, and conduct them to the easiest place from whence
money could be obtained; indeed, some of the commanders, especially
Chares, were themselves not less ready than their soldiers to profit
by such depredations.[463] Hence the armaments sent out by Athens
sometimes saw little of the enemy whom they were sent to combat,
preferring the easier and more lucrative proceeding of levying
contributions from friends, and of plundering the trading-vessels
met with at sea. Nor was it practicable for Athens to prevent such
misconduct, when her own citizens refused to serve personally,
and when she employed foreigners, hired for the occasion, but
seldom regularly paid.[464] The suffering, alarm, and alienation
arising from hence among the confederates, was not less mischievous
than discreditable to Athens. We cannot doubt that complaints in
abundance were raised in the confederate synod; but they must have
been unavailing, since the abuse continued until the period shortly
preceding the battle of Chæroneia.
[463] Diodor. xv. 95.
[464] Demosthenes, Philip, i. 46. s. 28. ἐξ οὗ δ᾽ αὐτὰ καθ᾽ αὑτὰ
τὰ ξενικὰ ὑμῖν στρατεύεται, τοὺς φίλους νικᾷ καὶ τοὺς συμμάχους,
οἱ δ᾽ ἐχθροὶ μείζους τοῦ δέοντος γεγόνασιν. Καὶ παρακύψαντα ἐπὶ
τὸν τῆς πόλεως πόλεμον, πρὸς Ἀρτάβαζον ἢ πανταχοῦ μᾶλλον οἴχεται
πλέοντα· ὁ δὲ στρατηγὸς ἀκολουθεῖ· εἰκότως· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἄρχειν
μὴ διδόντα μισθόν.
Ibid. p. 53. s. 51. Ὅποι δ᾽ ἂν στρατηγὸν καὶ ψήφισμα κενὸν καὶ
τὰς ἀπὸ τοῦ βήματος ἐλπίδας ἐκπέμψητε, οὐδὲν ὑμῖν τῶν δεόντων
γίγνεται, ἀλλ᾽ ~οἱ μὲν ἐχθροὶ καταγελῶσιν, οἱ δὲ σύμμαχοι τεθνᾶσι
τῷ δέει τοὺς τοιούτους ἀποστόλους~.
Ibid. p. 53. s. 53. Νῦν δ᾽ εἰς τοῦθ᾽ ἥκει τὰ πράγματα αἰσχύνης,
ὥστε τῶν στρατηγῶν ἕκαστος δὶς καὶ τρὶς κρίνεται παρ᾽ ὑμῖν περὶ
θανάτου, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς οὐδεὶς οὐδ᾽ ἅπαξ αὐτῶν ἀγωνίσασθαι
περὶ θανάτου τολμᾷ, ἀλλὰ τὸν τῶν ἀνδραποδιστῶν καὶ λωποδυτῶν
θάνατον μᾶλλον αἱροῦνται τοῦ προσήκοντος.
Compare Olynthiac ii. p. 26. s. 28; De Chersoneso, p. 95. s.
24-27, cont. Aristokrat. p. 639. s. 69; De Republ. Ordinand. περὶ
Συντάξεως, p. 167. s. 7. Also Æschines de Fals. Legat. p. 264. c.
24; Isokrates, De Pace, s. 57. 160.
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