History of Julius Cæsar, Vol. 2 of 2Napoleon III, Emperor of the French
History
History of Julius Cæsar, Vol. 2 of 2
Napoleon III, Emperor of the French
Caesar, Julius; Rome -- History -- Republic, 265-30 B.C.
“As the principal arm of the ancients was the sword or the pike, their
habitual formation was in deep order. The legion and the phalanx, in
whatever situation they were attacked, either in front, or in right
flank, or in left flank, faced everywhere without disadvantage; they
could encamp on surfaces of small extent, in order to have less labour
in fortifying the line of circuit, and in order to hold their ground
with the smallest detachment possible. The principal arm of the moderns
is the projectile; their habitual order has naturally been narrow order,
the only one which permits them to bring all their projectiles to bear.
“A consular army enclosed in its camp, attacked by a modern army of
equal force, would be driven out of it without assault, and without
being able to use their swords; it would not be necessary to fill up the
fosses or to scale the ramparts: surrounded on all sides by the
attacking army, pierced through, enveloped, and raked by the fire, the
camp would be the common drain of all the shots, of all the balls, of
all the bullets: fire, devastation, and death would open the gates and
throw down the retrenchments. A modern army, placed in a Roman camp,
would at first, no doubt, make use of all its artillery; but, though
equal to the artillery of the besieger, it would be taken in _rouage_
and quickly reduced to silence; a part only of the infantry could use
their muskets, but it would fire upon a line less extended, and would be
far from producing an effect equal to the injury it would receive. The
fire from the centre to the circumference is null; that from the
circumference to the centre is irresistible. All these considerations
have decided modern generals in renouncing the system of retrenched
camps, to adopt instead natural positions well chosen.
“A Roman camp was placed independently of localities: all these were
good for armies whose strength consisted in arms used with the hand; it
required neither experienced eye nor military genius to encamp well;
whereas the choice of positions, the manner of occupying them and
placing the different arms, by taking advantage of the circumstances of
the ground, is an art which forms part of the genius of the modern
captain.
“If it were said now-a-days to a general, You shall have, like Cicero,
under your orders, 5,000 men, sixteen pieces of cannon, 5,000 pioneers’
tools, 5,000 sacks of earth; you shall be within reach of a forest, on
ordinary ground; in fifteen days you shall be attacked by an army of
60,000 men, having 120 pieces of cannon; you shall not be succoured till
eighty or ninety-six hours after having been attacked. What are the
works, what are the plans, what are the profiles, which art prescribes?
Has the art of the engineer secrets which can solve this problem?”[447]
CHAPTER IX.
(Year of Rome 701.)
(BOOK VI. OF THE “COMMENTARIES.”)
CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE NERVII AND THE TREVIRI--SECOND PASSAGE OF THE
RHINE--WAR AGAINST AMBIORIX AND THE TREVIRI.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account