VI. Towards the same time, Cæsar, in spite of the near approach of the end of the fine season, marched against the Morini and the Menapii, who alone, after the entire pacification of Gaul, remained in arms, and had not sent him deputies. These peoples had no towns: they dwelt in caverns[294] or under the tent.[295] Taught by the example of their neighbours, they avoided engaging in pitched battles, and withdrew into the recesses of woods and marshes. Cæsar, when he arrived in their country, was attacked by surprise at the moment he was beginning to fortify his camp. He drove them back into the woods, but not without experiencing some loss; then, to open himself a wider road in the forest which had become their asylum, he caused the trees between him and the enemy to be cut down, and, heaping them up to the right and the left, he formed two ramparts, which secured him from attacks on the flank. This work was executed in a few days over a great space with incredible celerity. Cæsar had already reached the place of refuge of the Morini and the Menapii, who retired further and further into the thickness of the forests; already he had captured their herds and baggage, which they were obliged to leave behind, when rain falling in torrents, no longer permitting the soldiers to remain under tents, compelled him to retire.[296] He ravaged the country, burnt the habitations, and withdrew his army, which he placed in winter quarters (between the Seine and the Loire), among the Aulerci, the Lexovii, and the other peoples recently vanquished.[297] [Sidenote: Observations.] VII. The war of 698, directed almost exclusively against the peoples on the shores of the ocean, shows clearly that Cæsar already, at that time, entertained the design of making an expedition into the isle of Britain, for he not only destroys the only important fleet that could be brought against him, that of the Veneti, but he subjugates, either in person or by his lieutenants, all the countries which extend from Bayonne to the mouth of the Scheldt. It is worthy of remark how much the Romans were superior to the barbarians, by discipline, tactics, and the art of sieges; with what facility they raised terraces, made dykes, or promptly cut down a forest to clear themselves a passage through it. Truly, it is to the genius of Cæsar that the glory of all these brilliant successes belongs; but we must also acknowledge that he had under his orders the best army in the world, and the men most experienced in the military profession. Among these were the chiefs placed over the machines and siege operations, named _præfecti fabrorum_. They rendered him the most signal services. Mention is made of L. Cornelius Balbus,[298] who prepared the material of his army during his consulate, and Mamurra,[299] who, in spite of the bad character Catullus gives him in his satires, gave proof of his genius during the wars in Gaul. CHAPTER VII. (Year of Rome 699.) (BOOK IV OF THE “COMMENTARIES.”)