Caesar, Julius; Rome -- History -- Republic, 265-30 B.C.
At length Pompey, rendered desperate by the urgency of the destitution
and distress into which Caesar had shut him, made a series of rigorous
and successful attacks upon Caesar's lines, by which he broke away in
his turn from his enemy's grasp, and the two armies moved slowly back
into the interior of the country, hovering in the vicinity of each
other, like birds of prey contending in the air, each continually
striking at the other, and moving onward at the same time to gain some
position of advantage, or to circumvent the other in such a design. They
passed on in this manner over plains, and across rivers, and through
mountain passes, until at length they reached the heart of Thessaly.
Here at last the armies came to a stand and fought the final battle.
[Illustration: ROMAN STANDARD BEARERS.]
[Sidenote: The plain of Pharsalia.]
[Sidenote: Roman standard bearers.]
[Sidenote: Pompey draws up his army.]
[Sidenote: Forces on both sides.]
The place was known then as the plain of Pharsalia, and the greatness of
the contest which was decided there has immortalized its name. Pompey's
forces were far more numerous than those of Caesar, and the advantage in
all the partial contests which had taken place for some time had been on
his side; he felt, consequently, sure of victory. He drew up his men in
a line, one flank resting upon the bank of a river, which protected them
from attack on that side. From this point, the long line of legions,
drawn up in battle array, extended out upon the plain, and was
terminated at the other extremity by strong squadrons of horse, and
bodies of slingers and archers, so as to give the force of weapons and
the activity of men as great a range as possible there, in order to
prevent Caesar's being able to outflank and surround them There was,
however, apparently very little danger of this, for Caesar, according to
his own story, had but about half as strong a force as Pompey. The army
of the latter, he says, consisted of nearly fifty thousand men, while
his own number was between twenty and thirty thousand. Generals,
however, are prone to magnify the military grandeur of their exploits by
overrating the strength with which they had to contend, and
under-estimating their own. We are therefore to receive with some
distrust the statements made by Caesar and his partisans; and as for
Pompey's story, the total and irreparable ruin in which he himself and
all who adhered to him were entirely overwhelmed immediately after the
battle, prevented its being ever told.
[Sidenote: Appearance of Pompey's camp.]
[Sidenote: Pompey's tent.]
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