On this question, of such paramount importance to England, considering the vast amount of her maritime commerce, much has been said and written, and every view of the subject has been argued with great care and consummate ability. No doubt the feeling of nations is becoming more in favour of the principle of making all goods not contraband of war exempt from capture at sea, and the views of the more modern English statesmen are inclining in that direction; but it is only by taking a retrospective view of the measures unscrupulously adopted by both France and England during their mighty struggle that a conjecture can be formed of what will be the future effect of such or similar compacts. While waging internecine war against each other, the people of England and France were famishing alike for want of food. Should such circumstances again arise, it is not easy to suppose, much less to hope, that nations so powerful at sea as Great Britain, with their people thus suffering, would be bound by any compact that stopped the supply from America or elsewhere; and it is almost as futile to hope that they would relinquish their power of hampering their enemies’ commerce at sea unless it were stipulated that neutral nations are bound to enforce the compact. Though England still stands first as a maritime power, and has consequently at her disposal the most extensive means of destroying an enemy’s maritime commerce, she has, on the other hand, by far the largest amount of property of any nation at all times afloat, and must therefore be the largest sufferer in the event of hostilities with any power which can equip a fleet of privateers. Consequently, it was hoped by a large portion of the English people, when the American government in 1856 declined to become parties to the declaration of the European Powers assembled in conference at Paris, unless all private property was made free from capture at sea, that Great Britain would have readily acquiesced in the proposal. [Sidenote: Condemnations of ships in the West Indies,]