He objected, therefore, to the principle of reciprocity, as it would actually throw difficulties in the way of those who were willing to meet us. On any principle of reciprocity they must adopt that of equivalents, and this was impossible. Other countries had no colonies, and had, consequently, no equivalent advantages to offer in return for those conferred by England. He admitted, however, that there was a great distinction between reciprocity in produce and reciprocity in shipping. If they imposed retaliatory duties on the produce of various countries, for the purpose of meeting duties imposed on their own goods, they did not visit the same interests with this retaliation. For example, cotton and woollen goods were sent to Prussia: we received from Prussia, corn, timber, and wool. If Prussia imposed high duties on cotton and woollen goods, we could only retaliate by putting high duties on the corn, timber, and wool of Prussia when imported into England. The Prussian Government punished the woollen manufacturer and the cotton manufacturer of England by imposing high duties on their goods; and, then, the English Legislature punished them again by imposing high duties on the raw material from which those goods were manufactured. Nothing could be more monstrous than such a course of proceeding. If we acted on the principle of reciprocity, we ought to give perfect freedom of trade to those who gave perfect freedom of trade to us. If the United States admitted our goods duty free, we could not do less than admit the corn of the United States free. [Sidenote: Doubtful even in the case of shipping.] [Sidenote: Difficulty of the “Favoured-nation” clause.]