These propositions have been evident to all practical men in America, as they must be to those on this side of the Atlantic. In the construction of the hull, greatly increased strength is obviously requisite. The resistance to a vessel, or its concussion against the water at a low rate of speed, will not be sensibly felt, but if that speed be considerably increased, and the concussion made quicker without a corresponding increase in the strength of the frame and hull of the ship generally, the ship will creak, strain, and yield to the pressure until she finally works herself to pieces, at the same time disarranging the engines, whose stability, bracing, and keeping proper place and order depend first and essentially on the stability of the hull. If the resistance to a vessel in passing through the water increases as the square of the velocity, and if, in addition to this outward thrust against the vessel, she has to support the greater engine power within the hull, which has increased as the cube of the velocity, then her strength must be made adequate to resist without injury these two combined forces against which she has to contend. The same increased strength is also necessary in the engines and boilers. It is evident that if the boilers have to generate and the engines to employ twice the power and exert twice the force, they must also have twice the strength, and there is no working arrangement in any way connected with the propulsion of the ship that does not partake of this increase: every pump, every valve, every bolt is connected, directly or indirectly, with the engine economy of the ship. All this is equally applicable to the ship’s hull, though in a less degree in the case of iron vessels than in those of wood. It is unnecessary to dwell upon the cost of repairs: indeed, the rapid motion of heavy parts of machinery and the necessarily severe concussions and jarrings cannot fail to destroy the costly working parts of the engine, entailing heavy and expensive repairs and substitutions. But first cost and current expenses do not for the moment appear to have been considered by any person interested in the Collins line. One thought, and one only, prevailed, and that thought was embodied in the resolution to run the Cunarders off the Atlantic, or at least to “neutralize,” as was expressed in the discussions of the period, “an existing foreign monopoly.” The enterprise they proposed “was one of a national character, and the semblance or reality of monopoly on their side was lost,” they alleged, in the stipulation of the contractors themselves to transfer their ships at cost price with their contracts, and all the additional facilities that might be extended to them by Congress “to any person who might be acceptable to the United States’ Government, and capable of carrying out an enterprise of such vital importance to the nation.”