With regard to the seaworthiness, of a ship and the competency of her crew, it would, while maintaining the valuable existing laws for the examination of the officers, and the engagement and discharge of the seamen, be desirable to sweep away the great bulk of the legislative technical _details_, which even Parliament in its wisdom knows little about, and require shipowners to produce vessels in all respects seaworthy, under heavy penalties for negligence, while leaving them to manage their own affairs as to the best mode of construction, number, and efficiency of crew, outfits, load line, and so forth. Such matters cannot be effectually dealt with by Act of Parliament; but, if they could, is it just, is it proper, that the nation should be required to take upon itself responsibilities, essentially, belonging to individuals? If it does, we shall most assuredly create greater dangers and bring about greater misfortunes and calamities, than those we attempt to obviate by well-meant but injudicious legislation. [Sidenote: Cunard line shows what can be done.] The case of the Cunard Company is a striking instance of what individuals can do. Legislative enactments are not required to regulate the conduct of such men as constitute the managing owners of this company, nor of that of the great majority of British shipowners. They know that a good ship, well managed and well found, is a much better investment than a bad one. But they likewise know, and therefore the Government can always depend upon the support of such men in any wise and necessary legislative measure, that there are interlopers in their trade who “go down to the sea in ships and do business on the mighty waters” of quite as knavish a character and, even more heartless, than the swindlers who concoct joint stock undertakings on shore to rob the widow of her mite and the fatherless children of their daily bread: they know, also, that there are very bad men who send their ships to sea to be lost, and villains who actually scuttle them. Nor are they unaware that, among their number, there are men who smile when their ships are lost _because_ they are well insured.[227] Therefore, so far from objecting to general laws of even a much more stringent character than those at present in force, they would welcome them if, by their rigorous enforcement, the perpetration of crime could be more effectually checked. If, for instance, punishment was made more certain and severe, bad men would hesitate before they over-insured their ships in the hope of realising profits out of disasters, especially where loss of life occurs. It is only a question of degree between the man who smiles when his ship founders, and the rogue who dispatches her for the purpose of being cast away; and Parliament, when it again deals with the loss of life and property at sea, might do well to direct its attention more than has hitherto been done to _over-insurance_, and to